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ANDRES ADAMSON

Duke Magnus and His “Livonian Kingdom”

Abstract



DOCTORAL THESIS

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Chair of Estonian History, Institute of History, Tallinn University, Estonia.

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DUKE MAGNUS AND HIS “LIVONIAN KINGDOM”

Summary

The dissertation examines the role of Duke Magnus of Holstein (1540–1583, in 1570–1577 the nominal King of Livonia as vassal of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible of Moscow) during the period of the Livonian War. The research identifies the forces that supported Magnus during various periods, along with their goals; provides an insight into why and how Magnus became a pretender to the role of the ruler of Livonia; demonstrates that Magnus’ inner circle was dominated by representatives of the local landed gentry, etc. Due consideration is given to the general nature of the Danish-Russian relations, international background to the establishment of the “Kingdom of Livonia”, contents of the agreements concluded between Duke Magnus and Tsar Ivan the Terrible in 1570, reasons for the failure of the project of vassal kingdom in 1570–1571, the anatomy of the final collapse of 1577, etc.

During the critical periods of his life (in 1560, 1570–1571, 1577–1578) Magnus endeavoured to pursue a policy autonomous of his suzerains – at different times, Frederik II, Ivan the Terrible and Stefan Batory – aimed at taking control of the whole of Livonia, or at least the larger part of the territory. He predominantly relied on the faction of the Livonian landed gentry that attempted to put an end to the Livonian War through a compromise with Russia, initially with Denmark’s mediation, and later through a direct pact with Muscovy, while maintaining legal ties with the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. After the military-political and financial disaster that struck him in 1560 following the initial rapid success, Magnus was in 1561–1566 subjected to the control of the Danish royal vicegerents, nonetheless trying to pursue a policy differing from that of Denmark. The support given by Frederik II to his brother was insufficient, ensuing from the principal line of the Baltic policy that Denmark had opted for in 1558 – not to engage in armed conflicts with Muscovy or Poland-Lithuania. Disappointed in Denmark’s passive policy and threatened by the Swedes, Duke Magnus and his supporters in Livonia, blinded by the deceptive promises of the Russian diplomacy, took the path of military political opportunism. The establishment of the “Kingdom of Livonia” was decided in the context of the hopes of Ivan the Terrible to achieve the division of Poland-Lithuania between Russia and the Habsburgs through a *rapprochement* to the Holy Roman imperial household. The Stettin Peace Congress of December 1570 generated a new international and legal situation around Livonia. Magnus abruptly lost support among the Livonian gentry, pushing him into full dependence on Ivan the Terrible. The attempts of Duke Magnus to achieve at least partial formation of the “kingdom” or exchange his estates in Livonia for those in Germany fell through. In 1577 Duke Magnus, in an altered international situation (involving power vacuum in Trans-Dvina Livonia) and after secret negotiations with representatives of Poland-Lithuania, again tried to pursue a traitorous policy towards Tsar Ivan the Terrible which, however, ended in a disaster owing to the hopeless imbalance of forces.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

- I. Andres Adamson 2008. Eestlastest Vene sõjateenistuses Liivi sõja ajal. – *Sõdur*, 1, 27–31.
- II. Andres Adamson 2007. Saaremaa mõisamehed aastail 1563–1564. – *Saaremaa Muuseumi kaheaastaraamat 2005–2006*. Kuressaare, 17–29.
- III. Andres Adamson 2006. Стремление ливонской элиты к миру с Россией в годы Ливонской войны. – *Ethnic Images and Stereotypes – Where is the Border Line?* (Russian-Baltic Cross-Cultural Relations). Proceedings of the III International Scientific Conference on Political and Cultural Relations between Russia and the States of the Baltic Region (Narva, October 20–22, 2006). (Studia Humaniora Et Paedagogica Collegii Narovensis, II.) Narva, 2007, 17–36, 353–356. Theses published in the collection of conference papers: Narva, 2006, 27–28, 94–95.
- IV. Andres Adamson 2006. Liivimaa mõisamehed Liivi sõja perioodil. – *Acta Historica Tallinnensia*, 10, 20–47.
- V. Andres Adamson 2006. *Hertsog Magnus von Holsteini roll Läänemere-ruumis Liivi sõja perioodil*. Humanitaarteaduste dissertatsioonid, 16. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus.
- VI. Andres Adamson 2005. *Hertsog Magnus 1540–1583. Tema elu ja aeg*. Tallinn: Argo.

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE DOCTORAL THESIS

Introduction

Duke Magnus of Holstein (1540–1584), in 1570–1577 the nominal King of Livonia as vassal of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible of Moscow (1530–1584; the Grand Prince of Moscow since 1533 and Tsar of All Russia from 1547) is usually either overlooked in historiography, or else treated in a conspicuously ridiculing and condescending manner. However, during the critical periods of his life (in 1560, 1570–1571, 1577–1578) Magnus made his decisions independently of his suzerains – at different times, Frederik II (1534–1588: King of Denmark and Norway since 1559), Ivan the Terrible and Stefan Batory (István Báthory, lived in 1533–1586; Prince of Transylvania in 1571–1575, King of Rzeczpospolita since 1575) – and pursued an autonomous policy aimed at taking control of the whole of Livonia, or at least the larger part of the territory. This is, of course, a simplified way of putting it. For the most part of his time spent in Livonia, it was far from reality, and “independence” should be interpreted as rather relative since Magnus’ operational freedom understandably depended on the concrete international situation at each critical moment, as well as on the power lines between Denmark, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, which he had to negotiate. In a word – what Magnus did was to use the opportunities presenting themselves. All his suzerains pursuing their own ambitions in Livonia and trying to keep Duke Magnus under control, it is obvious that without any considerable local support it would have been impossible for him to maintain his position as a sovereign pretender and a force to be reckoned with over such a long period and through so many political disasters. As a matter of course these forces need not be of exclusively Livonian origin; they could and did indeed change over time – for example, in a confrontation with his brother King Frederik II Magnus relied on his mother the Dowager Queen Dorothea (1511–1571), and to a lesser extent on his other relatives. He also repeatedly tried to appeal for the support of Sigismund II August (Zygmunt II August, lived in 1522–1572; the Grand Prince of Lithuania since 1544, King of Poland from 1548), Erik XIV (1533–1577; King of Sweden 1560–1568) and Johan III (1537–1592; King of Sweden from 1569), or enter into special pacts with them. However, Livonia was bound to have local forces on whom Magnus could rely or – what is even likelier – who in turn used or tried to use Magnus in their own interests to carry out their policies that differed from the interests of the above-mentioned suzerains. The objection that it was only natural and inevitable to rely on the local landed gentry is only partially true. After all, Magnus could have just acted as a representative of Danish interests in Livonia, never coming into collision with the Danish Crown, and remaining loyal to the latter in the face of the disparate behaviour (which did occur indeed) of the nobility under his jurisdiction. The first half of Magnus’ political career (until 1570) displays distinct periods when his actions were subject to supervision by Danish court officials as well as periods when he endeavoured to turn the tide, or during which the leash was slacker or totally non-existent. More plausible is the assumption according to which, especially in the latter cases, Magnus’ Livonian followers were implementing their more independent policy that was often at variance with the interests of the Danish Crown – which was particularly evident in the years 1560 and 1570. However, Magnus’ personal ambitions which he sporadically sought to realise in defiance of his wider circle of supporters, specifically during the final years of his life, should not go unnoticed either. The question of who actually used whom and when, and whether their interdependence was of proportional or inversely proportional nature, shall remain open to further debate.

The initial aim of this research was largely conceptual – a desire to demonstrate that it is possible, even on the basis of the material widely circulating in historical writing, to draw conclusions of sufficient evidential value that differ substantially from the claims put forth hitherto; and that the

existing historiography has been prejudiced in its judgement of Magnus' actions and guided by contemporary inimical opinions and attitudes, playing down and ridiculing his role, influence, etc (perceiving "him" as a personification of his retinue and supporters). To this end it was crucial to identify, with sufficient degree of proof, the forces that supported Magnus in different periods, along with their own agendas; it was also essential to ascertain why and how Magnus became a pretender to the "throne" of the whole of Livonia or a considerable part of the territory; to demonstrate that the so-called inner circle of Magnus was dominated by representatives of the local landed gentry – individuals in leading roles rather than marginal players in their social environment – while focusing on their geographical background and examining the overlapping elements in their biographies and pursuits. The working hypothesis was the following: in his career and ambitions Duke Magnus predominantly banked on the particular faction of the Livonian landed gentry that sought the termination of the Livonian War through a compromise with Russia, initially with Denmark's mediation, and subsequently, an opportune moment or situation presenting itself, through a direct pact with Muscovy. Considering the geographical range of the activities of Duke Magnus, this faction was comprised of the landed gentry and urban citizens of the Bishopric of Ösel-Wiek, and to a lesser extent, of the Bishopric of Courland, later also of the Russian dependency of Livonia (mostly the former Tartu Bishopric) and the former Riga Bishopric. The only areas fully excluded were the Courland and Zemgale territories – formerly under the Order authority, later governed by the duchy.

It was also important to ponder the odds of success of Magnus and his supporters, and the reasons for the failure. It was essential to place Magnus' political moves in a wider context in order to be able to capture the associations and motives that have hitherto escaped closer attention.

Indeed, during the process new problems and some critical episodes came to the fore: the general nature of the Danish-Russian relations, the international background to the institution of the "Kingdom of Livonia", the contents of the agreements concluded between Duke Magnus and Tsar Ivan the Terrible in 1570, the reasons for the failure of the vassal kingdom project in 1570–1571, the anatomy of the final collapse that occurred in 1577, etc. During a closer scrutiny of these problems the principal goal of the research increasingly metamorphosed into an attempt to provide a general overview of the hitherto neglected activities of Magnus in Livonia. Such a change in objectives simultaneously reduced the danger of adopting an excessively "rehabilitating", idealistic, positively tendentious attitude towards Duke Magnus.

The present dissertation is, therefore, not intended to be a full and comprehensive biography of Duke Magnus but instead focuses on his ties with Livonia and its fate. Nor was it the goal of this research to provide a thorough historiographic overview of the earlier research in the given subject area, but rather to expose new angles – as a result of thorough consideration and analysis of the available information in the shape of sources and earlier academic research. It is because of the latter that the present study does not claim to be conclusive or pretend to exhaust the subject matter. On the contrary, the thesis is meant to inspire further, complementary and more specific research attempts.

Sources and historiography

The principal and extensively exploited sources of information about the progress of the Livonian War in the Estonian and Latvian territories are represented by the chronicles of Johann Renner, Balthasar Russow and Salomon Henning. J. Renner, employed by the Livonian Order as a lawyer

and notary, wrote his “History of Livonia” after returning to Germany in 1561, and continued working on it until his death in 1583. The most valuable part of his chronicle is made up by the coverage of the events of 1556–1561 that he bore witness to. Renner’s chronicle was discovered and published in the 19th century, partial translation into Estonian was first published in 1995.¹ The best-known and, because of its belletristic style, also widest-read chronicle about the Livonian War is the one written by the pastor of the Holy Spirit Church of Tallinn B. Russow. The first two editions of the chronicle (in Low German) were issued in Rostock in 1578, the third and revised edition was published in Barth in 1584. The present thesis relies on the latest Estonian edition², which is widely used in the local historical writing. The chronicle of S. Henning (secretary, counsellor and chancellor of the Master of the Order and later Duke of Courland Gotthard Kettler)³ covers the events of 1554–1590 and its first edition was published in Rostock in 1590. Henning’s chronicle is ostensibly impartial, however, its main focus is on the person and interests of Kettler. This fact irritated the other parties concerned, particularly the city of Riga, and the chronicle was therefore banned in Riga and several German cities for years, the copies of the second edition were confiscated on the orders of King of Poland-Lithuania Sigismund III. All the three chroniclers wrote about Duke Magnus: most extensively Henning who had numerous personal contacts with Magnus during the Duke’s stay in Courland in the 1560s and in 1578–1583. Also, all the three chroniclers, for different reasons, displayed a critical attitude towards the Duke, or even regarded him with covert, if not overt animosity.

The rest of Magnus’ contemporaries and Baltic chroniclers of later periods hardly add any details or comments to his story⁴; however, the names not to be overlooked are Franz Nyenstede⁵ and Christian Kelch who more than one hundred years later summed up the work of his predecessors in his “History of Livonia”.⁶ The tradition to maintain a negative (or evasive, moralising) attitude towards Magnus, or else ignore him altogether was later adopted by other authors. It is not surprising actually, as the history of the Livonian War could be best described through the old saying, “history is written by the victors”. Denmark was by no means the victor; its legally justified claims to the Estonian territory had lost their relevance by the end of the war, and the territories that the Danish Crown had acquired meanwhile (with the exception of Saaremaa) had been lost. Moreover, Duke

¹ Johann Renneri Liivimaa ajalugu 1556–1561. Translated by I. Leimus. Tallinn, 1995.

² **Russow, B.** Liivimaa kroonika. Translated by D. and H. Stock. Stockholm, 1967 (facsimile edition Tallinn, 1993).

³ **Henning, S.** Livländische Churländische Chronica. – Scriptores rerum Livonicarum. II. Riga-Leipzig, 1848.

⁴ See: **Taube, A. Fh. von.** “Der Untergang der Livländischen Selbständigkeit”: Die livländische Chronistik des 16. Jahrhunderts. – Geschichte der deutschbaltischen Geschichtsschreibung. Im Auftrage der Baltischen Historischen Kommission unter Mitwirkung von M. Garleff, J. von Hehn, W. Lenz herausgegeben von G. von Rauch. Köln-Wien, 1986; see also: **Raik, K.** Ajalookirjutuse kõrgaeg Eesti- ja Liivimaal. – Ajalooline Ajakiri 4 (115)/2001; for overview of the period’s printed sources see: **Reimo, T.** The reflection of the Livonian War in Contemporary Printed Works in Europe. – Starptautiska konference Latviešu grāmata un bibliotēka: 1525–2000, 8.11.2000–11.11.2000. Materialu krājums. 1. Rīga, 2000.

⁵ Franz Nyenstädt’s, weiland rigischen Bürgermeisters und königlichen Burggrafen, Livländische Chronik, nebst dessen Handbuch, erstere nach ältern und neuern Abschriften, letzteres nach dessen Originalhandschrift herausgegeben von G. Tielemann. (Monumenta Livoniae antiquae: Sammlung von Chroniken, Berichten, Urkunden und anderen schriftlichen Denkmalen und Aufsätzen, welche zur Erläuterung der Geschichte Liv-, Ehst- und Kurlands dienen. II. Bd.) Riga, 1839. About Nyenstede see: doctoral thesis of K. Raik defended at Tartu University in 2004, *Eesti- ja Liivimaa kroonikakirjutuse kõrgaeg 16. sajandi teisel poolel ja 17. sajandi alul*, containing partial translation of the chronicle into Estonian; electronic version – <http://www.utlib.ee/ee/index.php?kood=nimestik&cat=disser&tk=4>.

⁶ **Kelch, C.** Liivimaa ajalugu. Translated by I. Leimus. Tartu, 2004.

Magnus was never “one of their own” for any side for that matter, he managed to betray everyone, and at the end of the war represented his own personal interests rather than those of the Danish Crown, Muscovy or Poland-Lithuania, or even most of the residents of Livonia.

The correspondence of Duke Magnus with his brother King Frederik II of Denmark dating from the early years of his Livonian period has been preserved. These letters were discovered in the Danish secret archives by Carl Schirren, and were published in his three-volume collection of documents about the Livonian War (1883–1885).⁷ Unfortunately this publication only covers documents until 1562. Schirren had earlier performed analogous research in the National Archives of Sweden (similarly covering the period until 1562).⁸ Beside C. Schirren, the materials relevant to the subject found in the Danish and Swedish archives have been studied, analysed, published, or forwarded to other researchers by other historians.⁹ Of these publications, special mention should be made by the collections compiled by Yuri Shcherbachev.¹⁰ In the case of Denmark, the listed publications represent the documents of the German Chancellery, the so-called external branch of the then state administration. The regests of the correspondence and minutes of the Danish Chancellery directly concerning the Kingdom of Denmark (i.e. Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the Faeroese Islands) have been published in “Kancelliets Brevbøger vedrørende Danmarks indre forhold 1551–1660”.¹¹

In the Tallinn municipal archives the documents linked to Magnus were identified and published by Gotthard von Hansen.¹²

⁷ Neue Quellen zur Geschichte der Untergangs livländischer Selbständigkeit. Aus dem dänischen Geheime Archive zu Kopenhagen. Bd. I–III. Hrsg. v. C. Schirren. Reval, 1883–1885. (Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Esth- und Curlands. Neue Folge. Bd. IX–XI.) Duke Magnus’ letters are contained mostly in the last volume. Documents concerning Magnus are predominantly stored in the following fonds of the National Archives of Denmark: TKUA. Livland A I:2. Breve til Dels med Bilag fra Hertug senere Kong Magnus af Ösel, Wiek og Kurland Stifter og Administrator af Reval Stift til Kong Frederik II og enkelte andre 1559–1578; TKUA. Livland A II:7. Akter og Dokumenter vedrørende det politiske Forhold til Livland 1560–1562 (1579); TKUA. Livland A II:9. Akter og Dokumenter vedrørende det politiske Forhold til Livland 1566–1571; TKUA Livland A III:21. Forskellige Akter og Dokumenter 1259–1569; TKUA. Speciel Del. Livland A III. Tillaeg nr. 3. 1560–1569 og udat. Den hertugelige Regering i Livlands Arkiv: Indkomne og udgaaede Breve samt andre Akter og Dokumenter; TKUA Livland. Tillaeg 1560 – Tillaeg 1563; TKUA. Ausl. Reg. 1569–1571.

⁸ Quellen zur Geschichte der Untergangs livländischer Selbständigkeit. Aus dem schwedischen Reichsarchive zu Stockholm. Bd. I–VIII. Hrsg. v. C. Schirren. Reval, 1861–1881. (Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Esth- und Curlands. Neue Folge. Bd. I–VIII.) In the National Archives of Sweden the most relevant documents related to Magnus are found in Livonica I. Ordenmästarens arkiv 37: Hertig Magnus av Ösel papper.

⁹ See e.g.: **Helk, V.** Saaremaa arhiivimaterjalidest Taani Riigiarhiivis ja nende kasutamisest. – Saaremaa Muuseum. Kaheaastaraamat 1993–1994. Kuressaare, 1995.

¹⁰ Датский архив. Материалы по истории древней России, хранящиеся в Копенгагене. Москва, 1893 (mostly regests of the documents of the following publications, but going further in time); Копенгагенские акты, относящиеся к русской истории. – Чтения в Императорском обществе истории и древностей российских при Московском университете. Т. I–II. Москва, 1915–1916.; Русские акты Копенгагенского государственного архива. Санкт-Петербург, 1897.

¹¹ Kancelliets Brevbøger vedrørende Danmarks indre forhold 1551–1660. København, 1885–2005. In this multi-volume publication the documents concerning Duke Magnus are mostly found in Part 2 of Volume 1 (December 1558–1560, published in 1888, compiled by C. F. Bricka). To a lesser extent Magnus is mentioned in the volumes covering, respectively, the years 1561–1565 (published in 1893–1895), 1566–1570 (published in 1897), 1571–1575 (published in 1898), 1576–1579 (published in 1900), and 1580–1583 (published in 1903, all compiled by L. Laursen).

¹² Nachtrag. Auf “König Magnus” bezügliche Urkunden aus dem Revaler Ratsarchiv. Hrsg. v. G. von Hansen. – Beiträge zur Kunde Ehst-, Liv- und Kurlands. Bd. III. Reval, 1887. See also: **Hansen, G. von.** Johann Taubes und

In 1975 the Danish historian Frede P. Jensen published in *Danske Magazin* the self-justification letter of Duke Magnus about his relations with Tsar Ivan the Terrible.¹³ This source – the only one to supply a somewhat longer version of Magnus’ own argumentation – deserves a more detailed scrutiny. What we have here is an undated message from Duke Magnus originating, judging by the contents and context, from the spring of 1579 at the latest¹⁴, in which he endeavours to clear himself of accusations raised against him at different times by providing his own interpretation of the “Livonian Kingdom” affair and the preceding and subsequent events. The narrative is coherent, mostly logical, and gives a positive impression of the relevant abilities of the author. An identical copy written in the same hand was discovered by F. P. Jensen in the archive of Duke Ulrich of Mecklenburg¹⁵ then located in Göttingen.¹⁶ The initial number of copies was most probably higher, seeing that Duke Magnus was in a habit of sending identical missives to his crowned relatives – his brother King of Denmark Frederik II, his brother Duke Johann (Hans) the Younger of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Plön (1545–1622), his uncle Duke Johann (Hans) the Elder of Schleswig-Holstein-Hadersleben (1521–1580), his uncle Duke Adolf of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp (1526–1586), his brother-in-law Augustus, Elector of Saxony (1526–1586, Elector of Saxony from 1553) and sister Anna (1532–1585), another brother-in-law, Duke Wilhelm of Braunschweig-Lüneburg (1535–1592, married to Magnus’ sister Dorothea, 1546–1617), the above-mentioned Duke Ulrich, etc. Under the circumstances described below it was likely he adhered to a similar *modus operandi* in this particular case as well. It is thus possible that other copies or versions of this letter have preserved but have failed to attract attention.

It can be said with certainty that the author of the letter is Magnus, and that it is a copy of the original letter either written or dictated by him. Any attempts to identify the handwriting have failed; it probably belongs to a secretary or a clerk in Magnus’ chief residence during the said period, Piltene in Courland. It is also certain that the handwriting does not belong to Duke Magnus himself.

The published letter differs from the earlier, analogous missives of Duke Magnus in which he justifies his defection into the service of Ivan the Terrible¹⁷, in the sense that it is longer and more

Eilart Krauses Machinationen und die darauf durch “König Magnus” erfolgte Belagerung Revels 1570–1571 nach den Urkunden des revelsches Ratsarchivs. – Beiträge zur Kunde Ehst-, Liv- und Kurlands. Bd. III. Reval, 1887. In the Tallinn City Archives the documents related to Magnus are found in the Livonian War fond No 230.

¹³ Hertug Magnus af Holstens forsvarsskrift af 1579 om hans forhold til tsar Ivan den Grusomme. Med F. P. Jensen – Danske Magazin. Ottende Række, Femte Bind (1975), S. 54–83. The author would like to extend deep gratitude to Margus Laidre for bringing this publication to his attention.

¹⁴ National Archives of Denmark. TKUA. Speciel Del. Livland A III. Tillaeg nr. 3. 1560–1569 og udat. Den hertugelige Regering i Livlands Arkiv: Indkomne og udgaaede Breve samt andre Akter og Dokumenter. In fact, two copies of the said letter can be found there – the one the publication is based on, and an identical copy written in several different hands. The materials concerning Livonia found in the National Archives of Denmark were either systematised a long time ago or remain unsystematised; documents are often chronologically or thematically misplaced.

¹⁵ Duke Ulrich III of Mecklenburg-Güstrow, husband of Magnus’ great-aunt and father-in-law of Frederik II. Lived in 1527–1603, Duke from 1555/56. The same year Mecklenburg was divided into the larger Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (ruled by Ulrich’s elder brother Duke Johann Albrecht I, reigned in 1547–1576) and the smaller Duchy of Mecklenburg-Güstrow.

¹⁶ F. P. Jensen’s storage reference: Staatliches Archivlager, Göttingen. Schwerin, Auswärtiges Amt 229. Livonicae 1565, 1569, 1570, 1571–1584. At present the fond is located in *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz.

¹⁷ For example a message written in Kuressaare at the start of 1572 with variants addressed to the King of Denmark, Emperor Maximilian II, Elector of Saxony, etc. One copy of the letter is kept in the National Archives of Denmark (TKUA. Livland A I:2. Breve til Dels med Bilag fra Hertug senere Kong Magnus af Ösel, Wiek og Kurland Stifter og Administrator af Reval Stift til Kong Frederik II og enkelte andre 1559–1578) and has been

detailed. In F. P. Jensen's publication it takes up nearly 27 pages, the actual document the publication is based on is 26 pages long (plus two blank pages before and one after the text). This document, however, has an almost genetic connection to the referred letter from 1572 published by Y. Shcherbachev, and another letter from April 1578. According to F. P. Jensen, the document was found among the travel notes (memorial) of Magnus' special envoy Johann Behr. The memorial had been signed by J. Behr in Haderslev, and was dated May 12, 1579. The letter was accompanied by various copies of correspondence with other parties referred to in the text – nothing extraordinary in itself as far as Magnus' written communication is concerned. However, Behr's memorial and the copies are no more to be found with the document, nor has the author of the thesis been able to locate them elsewhere in the National Archives of Denmark.

Even though the letter of Duke Magnus is marred by the obvious distortions and misrepresentations typical of such self-justifications (for example, he totally overlooks the attempts made in 1566–1567 by himself and the Danish Crown to take control of Riga, Frederik II having already endorsed the city's privileges, as well as the 1570 mutiny of Klaus Kursell along with his own attempt to use it to capture Tallinn, not to mention the large-scale political machinations involved in the creation of the "Kingdom of Livonia" which went as far as nurturing plans for dividing Poland-Lithuania between Muscovy and the Habsburgs), it bears great significance as a source.

At different times, letters and documents signed by Magnus have been unearthed in various locations. And as a matter of course, the Duke is frequently mentioned in papers left behind by his contemporaries. Unfortunately these materials are scattered between numerous archives and fonds and, not just remaining partially unpublished, are probably still unidentified to a great extent. As a major exception, the regests of the Livonian-themed correspondence of Duke Albrecht I of Prussia¹⁸ have been published (until 1564 by the time of the publication of this thesis) – and have been used in this research.¹⁹

In the Russian sources originating from the period of the Livonian War Magnus hardly finds a mention. For example, the chronicles (*letopis*) only mention his becoming the vassal of Ivan the Terrible, the siege of Tallinn in 1570–1571, and the wedding in Novgorod. The correspondence of the Russian authorities concerning the Livonian War, Livonia and consequently also Duke Magnus, which was stored in the Moscow Kremlin, was almost totally destroyed in a series of fires, the fire of 1626 dealing the most severe damage. Whatever records survived the ravages have been published, yet they provide nothing except indirect links to the subject under discus-

published by the Russian historian Y. Shcherbachev (Копенгагенские акты, II, nr 224). The same fond also contains, for example, a longer letter from Magnus to Frederik II dated April 6, 1578, which was sent from Piltene after leaving the territory of Ivan the Terrible and describes the events of 1577. The various fonds of the National Archives of Denmark contain a plethora of Duke Magnus' letters on the same subject as well as their copies, replies sent to him and other documents (including a 1570 dossier with original letters and copies concerning Magnus' relations with J. Taube, E. Kruse and Ivan the Terrible – TKUA. Livland A II:9. Politiske Forhold 1566–1571).

¹⁸ Albrecht von Hohenzollern (1490–1568). Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights in 1510–1525, subsequently secularised, in the capacity of a vassal of Poland-Lithuania, as the first Duke of Eastern Prussia Albrecht I.

¹⁹ Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland (1557–1560). Regesten aus dem Herzoglichen Briefarchiv und den Ostpreussischen Folianten. (Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Herausgegeben von J. Kloorhuis und D. Heckmann. Band 60.) Bearbeitet von S. Hartmann. Köln-Weimar-Wien, 2006; Herzog Albrecht von Preussen und Livland (1560–1564). Regesten aus dem Herzoglichen Briefarchiv und den Ostpreussischen Folianten. (Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Herausgegeben von J. Kloorhuis und D. Heckmann. Band 61.) Bearbeitet von S. Hartmann. Köln-Weimar-Wien, 2008.

sion. On the other hand, the service records (*разрядные книги*) of Muscovy²⁰ provide valuable background material. The documents of the Russian Foreign Affairs Office (*Посольский приказ*) on negotiations with Duke Magnus have unfortunately perished. As regards Denmark, the relevant documents remain unpublished, and besides contain a gap for the years 1566–1570, which happens to be the period of greatest interest as regards the subject under discussion.²¹

In the second half of the 19th century the Baltic German historiography displayed great interest in the Livonian War – probably inspired by the constant curtailment of the autonomy and privileges of the Baltic Sea provinces by the Russian Empire, which focused attention on the past independence and its loss. The Baltic German historians identified and published numerous documents and narrative sources covering the period, which, however, only rarely have any direct relation to Duke Magnus; also the biographies of several individuals, contemporaries of the Livonian War, were published.²²

Only one longer biography was written about Duke Magnus during the whole period of more than four centuries following his death – a posthumously published work by the 19th century Baltic German author Karl Heinrich von Busse.²³ It was, however, evident immediately upon publication that Busse’s book had many gaps, the subtopics were not fully developed, etc. Busse did not manage to prepare his manuscript for print; he was, understandably, unable to rely upon the sources that became available during later periods, and yet this biography of Magnus remained the only source to be reckoned with for a very long time. True, we can find numerous short articles, concise entries in biographical dictionaries and lexicons²⁴ etc, albeit that these not just failed to meet Busse’s standards, but also predominantly relied upon his treatment. However, another Baltic German scholar, a Tallinn municipal archivist, subsequently Professor at Berlin University and foreign policy counsellor for Emperor of Germany Wilhelm II, Theodor Schiemann, deserves mention for the higher level of professionalism displayed in his study, which is also voluminous enough to warrant classification as a short monograph.²⁵ For example, to this day no specific research of such extent has been conducted on Gotthard Kettler.

²⁰ Разрядная книга 1475–1598 гг. Редактор В. И. Буганов. Москва, 1966; Разрядная книга 1559–1605 гг. Редактор В. И. Буганов. Москва, 1974; Разрядная книга 1475–1605 гг. Сост. Н. Г. Савич. Москва, 1982.

²¹ For the database on Russia’s 16th–17th century “deputies’ books” (*посольские книги*) see: <http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Russ/XVI/Posolbook/PosolBook.html>.

²² See: **Lenz, W.** “Alt-Livland” in deutschbaltischen Geschichtsschreibung 1870 bis 1918. – Geschichte der deutschbaltischen Geschichtsschreibung. Im Auftrage der Baltischen Historischen Kommission unter Mitwirkung von M. Garleff, J. von Hehn, W. Lenz herausgegeben von G. von Rauch. Köln-Wien, 1986.

²³ **Busse, K. H. von;** aus dessen nachgelassen Papieren herausgegeben von J. Fh. von Bohlen. Herzog Magnus, König von Livland. Ein fürstliches Lebensbild aus dem 16. Jahrhundert. Leipzig, 1871. Busse’s previous source publication was based on the materials derived from Count Rumyantsev’s private archive (in St. Petersburg): Herzog Magnus von Holstein und sein livländisches Königthum. Auszüge aus gleichzeitigen Actenstücken. Hrsg. K. H. von Busse. – Mitteilungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Kurlands. Bd. 8 (1857).

²⁴ E.g.: Eesti biograafiline leksikon. (Akadeemilise Ajaloo-Seltsi Toimetised II / Academiae Societatis Historicae Scripta II.) Chief editor A. R. Cederberg. Tartu, 1926–1929, pp 296–298.

²⁵ **Schiemann, Th.** Magnus, König von Livland. – Th. Schiemann. Charakterköpfe und Sittenbilder aus der baltischen Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts. Mitau, 1877 ja Hamburg-Mitau, 1885. The book also includes his biographies of Johann Taube, Elert Kruse and Jürgen Farensbach. Th. Schiemann has touched upon the subject in several other works of his.

Of contemporary researchers, mention should be made of Norbert Angermann²⁶ and the authors of the most recent biographies of Duke Magnus, Ursula Renner and Eckhardt Hübner.²⁷ Of Danish historians, the already mentioned F. P. Jensen²⁸ has to be given credit. Understandably there are many other authors who, while not focusing on Duke Magnus, briefly retell his “Kingdom of Livonia” story.²⁹ There is hardly an author specialising in this particular period who has chosen to ignore Duke Magnus.

It was relatively early on that Duke Magnus made his entry into Estonian-language historiography. In 1874 Jaan Jung devoted the first volume of his history series, “Kodu-maalt”, to Duke Magnus.³⁰ Later treatments, however, predominantly restricted themselves to brief narrations in the vein of B. Russow in textbooks and general overviews of the period, often reiterating the errors or misinterpretations of earlier researchers. A similar picture can be seen in Latvia (Magnus was, after all, not just the Bishop of Ösel-Wiek, but also the Bishop of Courland).³¹

Main results

Magnus’ arrival in Livonia and his emergence on its political scene were prompted by Denmark’s historical ambitions in the territory of Estonia, which were inevitably boosted during the period of Livonia’s disintegration, but also by the internal problems of the House of Oldenburg, the relatively faint prospect of solving these issues after the Peace of Augsburg, as well as by the concrete developments in Livonia. Even at the start of the Livonian War a coalition had emerged in Livonia endorsing an agreement with Russia as opposed to hostilities as an escape from the atrocities of war and the partitioning of Livonia. The project, however, required an external mediator

²⁶ Primarily – **Angermann, N.** Studien zur Livlandpolitik Ivan Groznyjs. (Marburger Ostforschungen, 32.) Marburg/Lahn, 1972. Angermann did not focus on Duke Magnus, however, his background analysis was novel at the time, and has not lost its relevance since. Additionally, N. Angermann has touched upon the subject in several other works.

²⁷ **Renner, U.** Herzog Magnus von Holstein als Vasall des Zaren Ivan Groznyj. – Deutschland-Livland-Rußland. Ihre Beziehungen vom 15. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert. Beiträge aus dem Historischen Seminar der Universität Hamburg. Hgg. von Norbert Angermann. Lüneburg, 1988; **Hübner, E.** Zwischen allen Fronten: Magnus von Holstein als König von Livland. – Zwischen Christianisierung und Europäisierung. Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas im Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit. Festschrift für Peter Nitsche zum 65. Geburtstag. Herausgegeben von Eck. Hübner, Ekkehard Klug und Jan Kusber. Stuttgart, 1998. U. Renner’s article is an overview that copies the errors made by previous authors, yet also reckons with contemporary analyses and sources.

²⁸ **Jensen, F. P.** Danmarks konflikt med Sverige 1563–1570. (Skrifter utgivet af Det historiske institut ved Københavns universitet. Bind XII.) København, 1982.

²⁹ Examples: **Lavery, J. E.** Germany’s northern challenge: the Holy Roman Empire and the Scandinavian struggle for the Baltic, 1563–1576. Boston-Leiden, 2002; **Taube, M. von.** Die Uxkull. Genealogische Geschichte der Gesamtfamilie von Uxkull (1229–1954). III. Teil. München, 1955; **Kirchner, W.** The Rise of the Baltic Question. (University of Delaware Monograph Series. Nr. 3.) Newark, 1954; **Королюк, В.** Ливонская война. Из истории внешней политики Русского централизованного государства во второй половине XVI в. Москва, 1954; **Donnert, E.** Der livländische Ordenritterstaat und Russland: der Livländische Krieg und die baltische Frage in der europäischen Politik 1558–1583. Berlin, 1963, etc.

³⁰ **Jung, J.** Liivimaa kuningas Magnus ja Wene Zaar Joann Wassiljevitch IV ehk tükike Wene- ja Läänemere maade ajalugust aastast 1530 kuni 1584. (Kodu-maalt, nr 1.) Tartu, 1874. J. Jung’s book was a slightly expanded retelling of pastor August Dübner’s work *König Magnus von Livland und Zaar Iwan Wassiljevitch IV. von Russland* (Rigascher Almanach für 1869, S. 1–66).

³¹ See e.g.: **Zelenskova, A.** Dānijas prinča Magnusa (1540–1583) darbība Livonijā. – Latvijas Kara muzeja gadagrāmata. Rīga, 2000.

for which Denmark was best suited for a number of reasons. This claim is supported by a wealth of documentary evidence. Despite the emergence of other candidates Duke Magnus, who had in 1559/60 become one of the landlords of Livonia while representing Denmark, was the best choice for the figurehead of the forces advocating this solution – the preservation of the Livonian Confederation in one form or another, and a compromise with Russia. However, this coalition was probably unwilling to succumb to Denmark's national interests, instead trying to pursue policies of its own. Backed by the circles thusly oriented and encouraged by his personal ambitions, Duke Magnus was the principal contender predominantly in the Estonian territory in 1560 and 1570–1571. A vassal of the Russian Tsar and deprived of any support by Denmark, it was not until 1577, however, that Magnus was hailed in Trans-Dvina Livonia (*Ducatus Ultradunensis*) as an alternative who could facilitate escape from Moscow's direct domination.

After the military-political and financial disaster that struck him in 1560 after the initial rapid success, Magnus was in 1561–1566 temporarily subjected to the control of the Danish royal vicegerents; however, even during this period he to a certain extent tried to pursue a policy differing from that of Denmark, expand his authority as well as revenues, shake off the patronage of Frederik II, and seek *rapprochement* to Poland-Lithuania and the Duke of Courland Gotthard Kettler. Consequently (even though such a positioning of the question means a major simplification of the problem, and the relationship discussed below was of proportional rather than inversely proportional nature) it is likely that it was Magnus' inner circle that guided him, and not the other way round. This inner circle to a great extent took shape immediately after Magnus' arrival in Livonia in 1560, and was mostly comprised of Livonian nationals. The principal Livonian counsellors and supporters have been identified from sources, and their concrete roles have been opened up as much as possible. Characteristically, Magnus hardly had any non-Livonian counsellors, with the exclusion of the German national Dietrich Behr and Christian Schapfer from Oldenburg who had tied his fate to Livonia.

It is obvious that Duke Magnus predominantly relied upon the *Stifts* of Ösel-Wiek (Saare-Lääne) and Courland (which was to be expected), and the expatriate gentry from Tartumaa. In the territory of Estonia Magnus at the outset of his activities enjoyed an almost absolute support from the Saare-Lääne gentry, and had remarkably strong backing in Tartumaa also. During his most active periods, particularly in 1560, 1565 and 1570–1571, Magnus could count on the support of a large part of the Harju-Viru-Järvamaa gentry, and was in 1570–1571 also backed by a considerable number of nobles in the Riga Bishopric. A fact worth mentioning is that, despite numerous exceptions, the landed gentry of Estonia (i.e. the *Stifts* of Tartu and Ösel-Wiek as well as Harju-Viru; nobility was scarce in the remaining former Order territories) and Latvia (mostly the Riga district) formed two separate dynastic systems. Of these two, it was the landed gentry of Estonia (probably due to historical and geographical factors) that threw its force behind Duke Magnus. The landed gentry participated in politics through clans and marital alliances. Although, in order to minimise risk to their lives, positions and wealth arising from possible power shifts, the local nobles doubtlessly dispatched influential members of their families to the other camps, Sweden and Poland-Lithuania in particular, the frequent presence of members of one or another clan in Magnus' household suggests that the respective clan was, if temporarily, playing on him. Among them were the families Üxküll, Farensbach, Vitinghof, Zoege, Wrangel, Kursell, Taube, Stackelberg, Ungern, Rosen, Tiesenhausen, Buxhoevden, Wulff, Bra(c)kel. If these families, some of them very numerous, were to be considered Magnus' overt or covert supporters (which would, however, be a major and unsubstantiated generalisation) they would have represented nearly half of the landed gentry in the Estonian territory. At any rate they represented the elite of the local nobility,

whereas Magnus' Livonian counsellors were prominent members of their respective families. As mentioned previously, the considerable support lent to Magnus by the Livonian nobles can be put down to their hopes of using Denmark to help Livonia exit the war with Russia while maintaining legal ties with the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The situation changed radically after the conclusion of the Stettin Peace Treaty in December 1570, and Magnus' support base among Livonian natives shrank abruptly, pushing him into total dependence on Ivan the Terrible. The choices made by the nobles of Trans-Dvina Livonia in 1577 were guided by their self-preservation instinct rather than political sympathies. For many noble families this patronage resulted in severe repressions, especially from the Muscovites (1577–1578), but also from the Swedish and Polish-Lithuanian authorities, after which the remaining shreds of sympathy began to vanish come autumn 1577.

It is more difficult to fathom the support for Magnus in the towns of Livonia. Compared to the Harju-Viru Nobility Association, the Tallinn Town Council, for example, and probably most of the citizens of Tallinn, had adopted a much more reserved attitude towards Denmark and Magnus. The citizens of Tartu who had either fled or had been deported to Russia saw Magnus as their saviour well until 1571. Other important indications were the hesitant behaviour demonstrated by the Riga city council in 1566–1567 and the readiness of the residents of Wenden (Cēsis) and Wolmar (Valmiera) to attack the Polish garrisons in 1577 in a bid to surrender to Magnus.

The attempts to identify the supporters of Duke Magnus will inevitably lead to a question about the so-called “household troops” of Livonia, and their role. A closer scrutiny of the composition of these units reveals that they essentially functioned as the local gentry militia. The scattered bands of household troops under diverse command, which only united in action in 1565 (conquest of Pärnu and blockade of Tallinn), in 1570–1571 (siege of Tallinn), and in 1574–1576 (first on Sweden's side, then came the sale of Läänemaa to the Danish Crown, and the loss of the territory to Muscovites), repeatedly sided with Duke Magnus, forming a larger part of his armed forces during the attempt to establish the “Kingdom of Livonia”. Some of the household troops remained in his service throughout his 23-year career in Livonia. It is, however, impossible to prove or even claim that at a certain point an absolute majority of the Livonian landed gentry and their armed units were on Magnus' side, even though this can be stated with some confidence about his concrete area of operations, and was particularly obvious during the siege of Tallinn in 1570–1571. But for this support Duke Magnus would not have been able to retain his position as a serious contender for power in Livonia for such a long period. However, it was not the armed forces that proved to be Magnus' biggest asset; on the contrary, his success was always built on effective propaganda and fruitful negotiations, while his failures were induced by attempts to solve problems and situations by means of force.

For three times – in 1560, 1570–1571 and 1577 – Magnus played *va banque*. The chances for success of Magnus and his supporters looked particularly good in 1560 and 1570. In the former case he had been recognised as their sovereign by the *Stifts* of Ösel-Wiek and Courland, and as their prospective ruler by the Tartu authorities; the Tallinn Bishop and Chapter together with the Harju-Viru gentry were on his side; the Order conditionally recognised his right of ownership of Estonia (the Tallinn Bishopric). In his failure, a crucial role was played by the irregularity in relations with Muscovy. In the latter case the initial success turned sour due to the unexpectedly strong resistance put up by Tallinn and the decisions adopted at the Stettin Peace Congress, which generated a new international situation around Livonia, and a new legal arrangement for the region, stunting Magnus' policy and the force of his propaganda. The fundamental reason for the

failure, however, in these concrete cases as well as in a broader sense, was the woefully inadequate and sharply disproportionate to the problems that needed to be solved, support offered to Magnus by his brother King Frederik II. This in turn was probably not so much a manifestation of the alleged antipathy of Frederik towards Magnus or the financial crisis generated by the Nordic Seven Years' War (although this was certainly a valid reason), but rather adherence to the principal line of the Baltic policy that Denmark had opted for in 1558 – not to engage in armed conflicts with Muscovy or Poland-Lithuania. In 1577, in a newly changed international situation (resulting in a power vacuum in Trans-Dvina Livonia) and after relatively successful secret negotiations with representatives of Poland-Lithuania, Duke Magnus again tried to pursue a policy antagonistic to and treacherous towards Ivan the Terrible – this attempt, however, ended in a disaster due to the hopeless imbalance of forces.

A closer scrutiny of the role that Duke Magnus of Holstein played in Livonia and, in a wider sense, in the Baltic Sea region during the Livonian War reveals the unfortunate tendency of the previously conducted research on the Livonian War to rely on retrospective judgement or interpretation, and excessively stress the roles of Russia, Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, not paying enough attention to the part played in these events by Denmark and the citizens of Livonia. The fictitious alliance of Denmark and Russia has proved a misconception. The Mozhaisk agreement of 1562 was in essence a neutrality pact, and in 1560 (formally until the conclusion of the said agreement) and 1575–1578 the states were engaged in warfare, the involvement of Denmark largely resulting from the improvisations of its Livonian subjects. The passive peace policy of the Danish Crown in Livonia, in turn, ensued from the non-existence of an alliance with Moscow and the above-mentioned desire to avoid hostilities with Russia and Poland-Lithuania. The diversion value that the backing enjoyed by Duke Magnus could have had in his struggle against Sweden paled in comparison to these threats. Whether the dreaded conflicts would have broken out indeed had Denmark adopted a more aggressive attitude (rather likely), or whether Sweden would have been able to start building an empire if Denmark had opted for an early, powerful intervention in Livonia – these questions remain but speculation. Disappointed in Denmark's passive policy and threatened by the Swedes, Duke Magnus and his supporters in Livonia, blinded by the deceptive promises of the Russian diplomacy, took the path of military political opportunism – and almost succeeded in their pursuits (but in all probability any success would have been only temporary anyway). However, it has to be stressed that at the start of this path (until the Stettin Peace Treaty), even without the support of Frederik II in his extremely difficult military, political and economic situation, Magnus at least had a free hand granted by his brother. Without this freedom it would have probably taken much more than high ambition to push Magnus to taking such radical steps. However, past the point of no return he had no other option than to admit his total failure. At the same time, the establishment and subsequent liquidation of the “Kingdom of Livonia” has to be viewed in the context of the eventually crushed hope of Ivan the Terrible to achieve the division of Poland-Lithuania between Russia and the Habsburgs through a rapprochement to the Holy Roman imperial household. In other words – the creation of a vassal structure in Livonia was predominantly inspired by external factors.

Duke Magnus was probably acutely aware of the failure of his policy, his own political marginalisation, and loss of supporters ever since 1571, despite a certain expansion of his direct area of authority, fresh family relations with the Tsar, etc. His repeated attempts to actually achieve at least partial formation of the “kingdom” or, alternatively, leave the game altogether proved to be nothing but failures. Eventually himself and what was left of his estates became for all the players involved

– Denmark (and the House of Oldenburg), Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy – an irksome problem that was not solved until the end of the Livonian War in 1583, and Magnus’ death.

Finally it has to be stressed that, even in the light of the evidence presented in this research, the above conclusions remain largely tentative, requiring additional in-depth investigation. It is, however, obvious that the traditional view of the Livonian War needs to be substantially reviewed and revised.

HERTSOG MAGNUS JA TEMA “LIIVIMAA KUNINGRIIK”

Kokkuvõte

Hertsog Magnust (1540–1583), kes oli aastail 1570–1577 Moskva tsaari Ivan IV Julma (1530–1584, Moskva suurvürst alates 1533 ja Vene tsaar alates 1547) vasallina nominaalselt Liivimaa kuningas, on ajalookirjutuses tavaks olnud kas ignoreerida või käsitleda teda ja tema tegevust rõhutatult naeruvääristavas, üleolevas võtmes. Samas ilmneb sündmuste käigust endast, et Magnus oli oma tegevuse kriitilistes, murrangulistes lõikudes (lihtsustatult: aastatel 1560, 1570–1571, 1577–1578) oma süseräänidest – eri aegadel Frederik II (1534–1588, Taani ja Norra kuningas alates 1559), Ivan Julm ja Stefan Batory (õieti Istvan Bathory, eluaastad 1533–1586; Transilvaania vürst 1571–1575, Rzeczpospolita kuningas alates 1575) – oma otsustes üsnagi sõltumatu ning püüdis ajada oma enda iseseisvat poliitikat, mille eesmärgiks oli kogu või suure(ma) osa Liivimaa enda võimu alla saamine. Magnuse tegevusvabadus sõltus arusaadavalt konkreetsest rahvusvahelisest olukorrast igal kriitilisel ajahetkel ning Taani, Rootsi, Poola-Leedu ja Moskoovia vahelistest jõujoontest, mille vahel tuli tal laveerida. Et kõik tema süseräänid aga järgisid Liivimaal oma huve ja püüdsid teda oma kontrolli all hoida, siis näib tõenäolisena, et hertsog Magnuse püsimine nii pika aja vältel ja nii mitme poliitilise krahhi järel vähegi tõsiseltvõetava võimupretendendina poleks olnud võimalik ilma mingisuguste arvestatavate tugijõududeta. Muidugi ei pruukinud need jõud pärineda ainult Liivimaalt ning võisid ajas muutuda ning muutusidki – näiteks vastasseisus oma venna kuningas Frederik II-ga toetus Magnus oma emale, leskkuninganna Dorotheale (1511–1571), vähem ka teistele sugulastele. Samuti üritas ta korduvalt apelleerida Sigismund II Augusti (Zygmunt II August, eluaastad 1522–1572, Leedu suurvürst alates 1544, Poola kuningas alates 1548), kuid ka Erik XIV (eluaastad 1533–1577, Rootsi kuningas 1560–1568) ja Johan III (eluaastad 1537–1592, Rootsi kuningas alates 1569) toetusele või sõlmida nendega erikokkuleppeid. Siiski pidid Liivimaal aga eksisteerima ka kohalikud jõud, kellele Magnus toetuda sai, või – mis veelgi tõenäolisem – kes omakorda kasutasid või püüdsid kasutada Magnust oma huvides omaendi, eespool nimetatud süseräänide huvidest erineva poliitika elluviimiseks. Vastuväide, et toetumine just kohalikule aadlile oli igati loomulik ja et teisiti see ei saanudki olla, on tõsi vaid osaliselt. Magnus võinuks ju olla ka lihtsalt Taani huvide esindaja Liivimaal ja mitte kunagi Taani krooniga vastuollu minna, jäädes viimasele lojaalseks oma võimuala aadli teistsuguse käitumise (mida tõepoolest esines) kiuste. Magnuse poliitilise karjääri esimesel poolel (aastani 1570) eristuvad selgelt perioodid, mil tema tegevus oli allutatud Taani kuninglike ametnike kontrollile, ja perioodid, mil Magnus püüdis kujunenud olukorda muuta või see kontroll oli nõrgem või puudus sootuks. Usutavana näib oletus, et just viimastel puhkudel teostas Magnuse liivimaalastest lähikond tema kaudu oma iseseisvamat, sageli Taani krooni huvidega vastuollu läinud poliitikat. Eriti selgelt ilmneb see aastail 1560 ja 1570. Seejuures ei saa aga tähelepanuta jätta ka Magnuse isiklike ambitsioone, mida ta üritas kohati ilmselgelt realiseerida ka oma laiema toetajaskonna kiuste. Eriti käib see tema elu lõpuaastate kohta.

Käesoleva uurimuse käigus tuli piisava tõestusastmega välja selgitada Magnust erinevates ajalõikudes toetanud jõud ja nende tollased eesmärgid; selgitada, miks ja kuidas muutus hertsog Magnus Liivimaa või selle olulise osa valitseja kandidaadiks; näidata, et Magnuse n-ö lähiringis domineerisid kohaliku aadli esindajad, ja et viimased polnud oma sotsiaalses keskkonnas marginaalsed, vaid juhtivad isikud, pöörates ühtlasi tähelepanu nende geograafilisele päritolule ning otsides seoseid

nende biograafiais ja tegevuses. Tööhüpoteesiks oli, et hertsog Magnus tugines oma pürgimustes eelkõige Liivimaa aadli sellele osale, mis püüdis Liivi sõda lõpetada Venemaaga sõlmitava kompromissi abil algul Taani vahendust kasutades, hiljem aga sobiva olukorra kujunedes otsese kokkuleppe abil Moskooviaga. Oluline oli ka vaagida Magnuse ja tema toetajate õnnestumisvõimalusi ja läbikukkumise põhjusi. Magnuse poliitilised sammud tuli asetada laiemale taustale, et tabada seoseid ja ajendeid, millele senini vähem tähelepanu on pööratud. Töö käigus nihkusid esiplaanile uued probleemid ja n-õ kriitilised episoodid: Taani-Vene suhete üldine iseloom, “Liivimaa kuningriigi” loomise rahvusvaheline taust, hertsog Magnuse ja tsaar Ivan Julma vahel 1570. a sõlmitud kokkulepete sisu, vasallkuningriigi projekti läbikukkumise põhjused 1570–1571, selle 1577. a toimunud lõpliku krahhi anatoomia jne. Töö ei ole mõeldud hertsog Magnuse täieliku biograafiana, vaid keskendub tema seostele Liivimaa ja selle saatusega.

Hertsog Magnuse ilmumine Liivimaale ja selle poliitikasse oli tingitud nii Taani ajaloolistest ambitsioonidest Eesti alal, mis Liivimaa konföderatsiooni lagunemise perioodil paratamatult võimendusid, Oldenburgide dünastia siseprobleemidest, Augsburgi usurahule järgnenud suhtelisest valikute vähesusest nende probleemide lahendamisel kui ka konkreetsetest arengutest Liivimaal. Teatud osa liivimaalasi nägi juba Liivi sõja algusest peale sõjakoledest pääsemist ja Liivimaa jagamist, kuid mitte sõjas, vaid kokkuleppes Venemaaga, milleks vajati aga vahendajat mingi välisjõu näol, kelleks omakorda kõlbas mitmel põhjusel enim Taani. Selle väite kasuks eksisteerib hulgaliselt dokumentaalseid tõendeid. 1559/60. a üheks Liivimaa maaisandaks saanud, kuid ühtlasi Taanit esindanud hertsog Magnus sobis kõige paremini järgmist lahendust – Liivimaa konföderatsiooni mingis vormis säilimine ja kompromiss Venemaaga – toetanud jõudude käilakujuks, ehkki kandidaate oli eri ajal teisigi. Samas ei soovinud sellise valiku kasuks otsustanud osa liivimaalastest nähtavasti alluda Taani riiklikele huvidele, vaid püüdsid jõudumööda ajada omaenda poliitikat. Isiklike võimuambitsioonidega hertsog Magnus oli selliselt orienteeritud ringkondade toel peamine võimupretendent eelkõige Eesti alal aastail 1560 ja 1570–1571. Taani toetuse minetanud Vene tsaari vasallina peeti teda Üleväina-Liivimaal Moskoovia otsevõimu alt päästvaks alternatiiviks veel 1577. aastal.

Pärast teda 1560. aastal esialgse kiire edu järel tabanud sõjalis-poliitilist ja finantskrahhi oli Magnus ajutiselt, 1561–1566, allutatud Taani kuninglike asehaldurite kontrollile, kuid ta üritas ka sel perioodil mõningal määral ajada Taanist eristuvat poliitikat, suurendada oma võimubaasi ja sissetulekuid, vabaneda Frederik II eestkostest ning läheneda Poolale-Leedule ja Kuramaa hertsog Gotthard Kettlerile. Niisiis (ehkki küsimuse selline asetamine tähendab probleemi väga suurt lihtsustamist ja järgnevalt väljatoodud suhe oli pigem võrdelise kui pöördvõrdelise iseloomuga) tuleb pidada tõenäoliseks oletust, et mitte niivõrd Magnus ei suunanud oma lähikonda, kui võrd tema lähikond teda. See lähikond kujunes suures osas välja kohe Magnuse Liivimaale saabumise järel 1560. aastal ja koosnes peamiselt liivimaalastest. Hertsog Magnuse tähtsamad liivimaalastest nõunikud ja toetajad on allikatest tuvastatud ning püütud nende konkreetset rolli võimalust mööda avada. Iseloomulik on, et mitteliivimaalastest nõunikke Magnusel peaaegu ei olnudki, kui algusaegade riigisakslane Dietrich Behr ja oma saatuse Liivimaaga sidunud oldenburglane Christian Schrapfer kõrvale jätta.

On ilmne, et hertsog Magnus sai toetuda eelkõige talle kuulunud Saare-Lääne ja Kuramaa stiftide (mis on ka loomulik) ning Tartumaalt põgenenud aadlile. Eesti alal oli Saare-Läänemaa aadli toetus Magnusele tema tegevuse alguses pea üldine, kuid ka tartumaalaste puhul oli see märkimisväärselt

lai. Magnuse iseseisva, s.o Taani kroonist sõltumatuma tegevuse kõige aktiivsematel aegadel, eriti 1560, 1565 ja 1570–1571, toetas teda kõige järgi otsustades ka suur(em) osa Harju-Viru-Järva aadlist, 1570–1571 ka märkimisväärne osa endise Riia peapiiskopkonna aadlist. Seejuures väärrib arvestamist asjaolu, et Eesti (s.o Tartu ja Saare-Lääne stiftid ning Harju-Viru; mujal endistel ordualadel oli aadlit napilt) ja Läti ala (peamiselt Riimaa) aadel kujutas endast paljudele eranditele vaatamata kahte teineteisest eraldiseisvat suguvõsade süsteemi. Neist olid selgemalt (küllap ajalooliste ja geograafiliste tõsiasjade tõttu) hertsog Magnuse selja taga Eesti ala aadlimehed. Aadel osales poliitikas perekondlike klannide ja abielulitüduna. Ehkki nad suunasid võimalikest võimuvahetustest nende elule, positsioonile ja omandile tulenevate riskide maandamiseks kindlasti oma suguvõsade mõjukaid liikmeid ka teiste osapoolte, eelkõige Rootsi ja Poola-Leedu leeri, annab ühe või teise perekonna liikmete sagedane esinemine hertsog Magnuse lähikonnas alust oletuseks, et vastav suguvõsa oli vähemalt ajutiselt panuse temale teinud. Sellisteks suguvõsadeks olid näiteks Üxküllid, Farensbachid, Vitinghofid, Zoeged, Wrangelid, Kursellid, Taubed, Stackelbergid, Ungernid, Rosenid, Tiesenhausenid, Buxhoevdenid, Wulfid ja Bra(c)kelid. Neid osalt väga arvuka liikmeskonnaga suguvõsade tervikuna Magnuse avalikeks või salajasteks toetajateks pidades (mis oleks küll lubamatult suur ja tõestamatu üldistus) tähendaks see juba ligemale poolt Eesti ala aadelkonnast. Igatahes kujutas see endast kohaliku aadli eliiti, juhtivat osa, Magnuse liivimaalastest nõunikud aga olid oma suguvõsade väljapaistvad esindajad. Liivimaa aadli ulatuslik toetus Magnusele oli, nagu eespool öeldud, ilmselt tingitud lootustest aidata Liivimaa Taani abiga välja sõjast Venemaaga, säilitades ühtlasi riigiõigusliku sideme Saksa Rahva Püha Rooma Keisririigiga. Stettini rahu sõlmimise järel detsembris 1570 muutus situatsioon radikaalselt ja Magnuse toetusbaas liivimaalaste seas ahenes järsult, muutes Magnuse täielikult sõltuvaks Ivan Julmast. Üleväina-Liivimaa aadli valikud 1577. aastal ei tulenenud enam poliitilistest sümpaatiast, vaid enesealalhoiuinstinktist. Magnuse toetamine tõi paljudele aadlisuguvõsadele kaasa raskeid represioone eriti moskoviitide (1577–1578), kuid ka Rootsi ja Poola-Leedu võimude poolt, mille järel veel säilinud toetuse riismed alates 1577. aasta sügisest häabusid.

Hertsog Magnuse toetust Liivimaa linnades on raskem hinnata. Võrreldes Harju-Viru rüütelkonnaga oli näiteks Tallinna raad ja küllap siis ka kodanike enamus Taani ja Magnuse suhtes märksa reserveerituma hoiakuga. Tartu põgenenud või Venemaale küüditatud kodanikud nägid Magnuses 1571. aastani oma päästjat. Olulised märgid on ka Riia rae kõhklused aastatel 1566–1567 ning Võnnu ja Volmari elanike valmisolek 1577. a Magnuse võimu alla minekuks Poola garnisone rünnata.

Katsed konkretiseerida hertsog Magnuse toetajaskonda juhivad paratamatult küsimuse juurde Liivimaa mõisameestest ja nende rollist. Mõisameeste üksuste koosseisude vaatlusel ilmneb, et nende näol oli põhimõtteliselt tegemist eelkõige kohaliku aadlimaakaitsevõega. Mõisameeste laialipillatud, erineva juhtimise all ja eri maaisandate teenistuses olnud salgad, mis ühtsema jõuna esinesid ainult 1565 (Pärnu vallutamine ja Tallinna blokeerimine), 1570–1571 (Tallinna piiramine) ja 1574–1576 (algul Rootsi poolel, seejärel Läänemaa müümine Taanile ja kaotamine moskoviitidele), kaldusid korduvalt hertsog Magnuse toetamise poole, moodustades “Liivimaa kuningriigi” loomise katse ajal enamuse otseselt tema relvajõududest. Mingi osa mõisameestest oli tema teenistuses kogu tema 23-aastase Liivimaa-karjääri ajal. Ei ole võimalik tõestada ega niisiis ka väita, et mingil ajahetkel oleks absoluutne enamus Liivimaa aadlist ja selle väeosadest olnud Magnuse poolel, kuid tema igakordses konkreetse tegevuspiirkonnas küll. Eriti ilmne oli see Tallinna piiramise kuudel 1570–1571. Ilma selle toeta ei oleks hertsog Magnuse nii kauaegne püsimine arvestatava valitsejakandidaadina Liivimaal ilmselt võimalik olnud. Siiski polnud

relvad Magnuse peamine argument; vastupidi, tema õnnestumised tulenesid alati edukast propagandast ja läbirääkimistest selleks soodsas rahvusvahelises olukorras, ebaõnnestumised aga katsetest probleeme ja olukordi jõuga lahendada.

Magnus läks kolmel korral – 1560, 1570–1571 ja 1577 – *va banque*. Tema ja ta toetajate õnnestumisvõimalused olid eriti reaalsed aastatel 1560 ja 1570. Esimesel juhul olid teda oma valitsejana tunnistanud Saare-Lääne ja Kuramaa stiftid ning oma tulevase valitsejana Tartu võimuorganid; Tallinna piiskop ja toomkapiitel koos osa Harju-Viru rüütelkonnaga olid tema poolel; ordu mõõnas tingimisi Eestimaa (Tallinna piiskopkonna) temale kuulumist. Läbikukkumisel sai otsustavaks suhete lõplik reguleerimatus Moskooviaga. Teisel korral varises esialgne edu kokku Tallinna oodatust visama vastupanu ja Stettini rahukongressi Magnuse jaoks katastroofiliste otsuste tõttu, mis tekitasid Liivimaa ümber uue rahvusvahelise ja Liivimaal uue õigusliku olukorra, lõigates jalad alt Magnuse poliitikal ja tema propaganda mõjukusel. Fundamentaalne nurjumispõhjus peitus aga nii nendel puhkudel kui ka üleüldse kuningas Frederik II täiesti ebapiisavas, lahendust ootavate ülesannete ja võimalustega järsus disproportsioonis olnud toetuses oma vennale. See omakorda ei tulenenud arvatavasti mitte Frederiku väidetavas antipaatiast Magnuse suhtes või finantskriisist seoses Põhjamaade seitsmeaastase sõjaga (ehkki ka neist asjaoludest), vaid juba 1558. a valitud Taani Liivimaa-poliitika pealiinist – mitte sattuda sõtta Moskoovia või Poola-Leeduga. Kolmandal korral, aastal 1577, üritas hertsog Magnus taas muutunud rahvusvahelises olukorras (tulemuseks muuhulgas jõuvaakum Üleväina-Liivimaal) ja pärast eelnevaid suhteliselt edukaid salaläbirääkimisi Poola-Leedu esindajatega ajada tsaar Ivan Julmast eristuvat ja viimase suhtes reetlikku poliitikat, mis lõppes aga krahhiga jõudude lootusetu ebavõrdsuse tõttu.

Hertsog Magnuse rolli avamine Liivimaal Liivi sõja perioodil muudab siinkirjutaja arvates ilmselt, et senised Liivi sõja käsitlused ei pööra sõja lõpptulemuse ja varasema historiograafilise traditsiooni mõjul piisavalt tähelepanu liivimaalaste endi ja Taani osale toimunud. Taani-Vene kujuteldavad liidusuhted on osutunud väärarusaamaks. 1562. aasta Možaiski leping oli sisult neutraliteedileping ning 1560 (vormiliselt nimetatud lepingu sõlmimiseni) ja 1575–1578 olid riigid sõjavahekorras, millesse Taani sattus mõlemal korral oma liivimaalastest alamate improvisatsioonide tõttu. Taani krooni passiivne rahupoliitika Liivimaal tulenes omakorda suuresti just liidu puudumisest Moskvaga ja eespool välja toodud soovist hoiduda sõjast Venemaa või Poola-Leeduga. Hertsog Magnuse tõhusama toetamise diversiooniväärtus vastasseisus Rootsiiga kahvatus nende ohtude kõrval. Tagantjärele võib vaid spekuloida oletustega, kas Taani teistsuguse, agressiivsema hoiaku korral oleks kardetud konfliktid Venemaa ja Poola-Leeduga tõesti puhkenud (pigem jah), ja kas Rootsi oleks Taani varase jõulise Liivimaal sekkumise korral üldse saanud võimaluse asuda suurriigi loomise teele. Taani passiivses poliitikas pettununa ja rootslaste poolt ohustatuina valisid hertsog Magnus ja tema liivimaalastest poolehoidjad Venemaa diplomaatia petlike lubaduste mõjul sõjalis-poliitiliste avantüüride tee, mida peaaegu oleks krooninud (küllap küll ajutiseks jäänud) edu. Tuleb siiski rõhutada, et selle tee alguses (kuni Stettini rahuni) oli Magnusel kui mitte just üliiraskes sõjalises, poliitilises ja majanduslikus olukorras Frederik II toetus, siis vähemalt tema poolt jäetud vabad käed. Kogu oma ambitsioonikuse juures poleks Magnus ilma selleta tõenäoliselt siiski nii radikaalseid samme astunud, need juba teinuna polnud tal aga mõnda aega muud tagasiteed kui oma täieliku lüüasaamise tunnistamine. “Liivimaa kuningriigi” loomist ja hilisemat likvideerimist tuleb samas enam vaadelda Ivan Julma lootuste ja nende hilisema purunemise kontekstis saavutada Saksa-Rooma keisrikojale lähenemise teel Poola-

Leedu jagamine Venemaa ja Habsburgide vahel. Teisisõnu – vasallmoodustise loomine Liivimaal oli tingitud valdavalt Liivimaa-välistest asjaoludest.

Hertsog Magnus adus ilmselt üsna selgelt oma poliitika läbikukkumist, iseenda poliitilist marginaliseerumist ja pooldajaskonna minetamist alates 1571. aastast, vaatamata tema otsese võimuareaali teatud laienemisele, sugulussidemetesse astumist tsaariga jne. Tema korduvad katsed saavutada “kuningriigi” tegelik osalinegi loomine või väljuda mängust kukkusid läbi. Lõpuks kujunes temast endast ja ta säilinud valdustest kõikidele osapooltele – Taani (ja Oldenburgid), Rootsi, Poola-Leedu ja Moskoovia – tülikas probleem, mis lahenes 1583. a Liivi sõja lõpu ja Magnuse surmaga.

Lõpetuseks tuleb rõhutada, et toodud järeldused jäävad ka käesolevas uurimuses esitatud tõendite valguses valdavalt hinnangulisteks ja nõuavad täiendavaid eriuurimusi mitmes küsimuses. Siiski on ilmne, et traditsiooniline vaade Liivi sõjale vajab tõsisid korrektiive.

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Professional Career

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2002 – Head of the Project of Developing Teaching History in Tallinn Pedagogical University

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1997–1999 Director of the National Examination and Qualification Centre
1996 – Director of the Centre for In-service Teacher Training and Methodics of the Ministry of Education

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