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Report

CSDP After Lisbon:
Comprehensive Security for Small States?

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Contents

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Abbreviations

BG – Battle Group

$C^{2/3}$ – Command & Control / & Communication

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIVCOM – Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

CMPD – Crisis Management Planning Directorate

CPCC – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

DG – Directorate General

EEAS – European External Action Service

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

EUMC – European Union Military Committee

EUMS – European Union Military Staff

HQ – Headquarter

HR/VP – High Representative for Foreign Relations and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoD – Ministry of Defence

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS – National Defence Strategy

NSC – National Security Concept

OHQ – Operational Headquarter

PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation

PnS – Pooling & Sharing

PSC – Political Security Committee

QMV – Qualified Majority Voting

SAC – Strategic Airlift Capability

TEU – Treaty of the European Union

TPP – Trans-Pacific-Partnership

UK – United Kingdom

US/A – United States / of America

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is aimed at analysing the impact changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty have on the common defence and security architecture of the European Union, in order to give an assessment of the relevance those changes have on the utility of CSDP for Estonia.

More specifically the research for this report is based on the following hypotheses:

1. The US interest in higher European contributions to the common defence architecture, positive developments in CSDP can strengthen NATO and the transatlantic alliance.
2. CSDP can provide increased security (both domestically and through pursuit of strategic interests abroad) for Estonia.
3. Estonia can utilize participation in CSDP missions and initiatives (such as the battle groups) and wider frameworks like the EDA as a strategic alliance building tool, with the potential to increase its intra-EU efficacy.

In order to investigate the salience of these hypotheses the research relies on scientific literature and official documentation, as well as interviews conducted with officials and independent experts in the region.

Concerning the developments brought on by the Lisbon treaty this report identifies four broad changes with significance to the performance of CSDP. The first is the creation of the High Representative for Foreign Relations and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). The HR/VP takes on all functions formerly held by the Troika with regards to the external relations of the Union and security policy. In an attempt to provide improved consistency in the EU's foreign and security policy the HR/VP not only represents the Union externally, but also holds key roles within both the Council (chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and the Political Security Committee (PSC)) and the Commission (acting vice president). This new position creates a bridge between Council and Commission – which often didn't present a unified front concerning foreign and security policy – and also unburdens the EU from the inconsistency brought about by the rotational 6 months council presidency.

The second important innovation is the EEAS, which is the organization aimed at empowering the HR/VP to perform his/her many duties. The most notable advancement concerning CSDP here is the unification of crisis management tools and organisations within this new structure. It also now includes a much needed civil-military planning capability in the form of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD).

The third development is PESCO, a mechanism, which allows member states to pursue intensified cooperation (in a <EU27 framework) in the fields of military capability development and creation of CSDP active assets. It specifically excludes operations and missions, which will remain under purview of the full Council and voted on by unanimity. PESCO can be established by a QMV in the council. Though, this has considerable potential it as of yet still untried in reality. The treaty text is rather vague concerning its specifics – a result of discrepancies among member states – and the result is that the exact meaning, method and implementation of PESCO is still being debated.

The last significant innovations are the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses. The Mutual Assistance Clause is, for all intents and purposes, an EU duplication of NATO Article 5. As such there is little to be said about it, except that so far it has not produced any real life manifestations in terms of defence capabilities or planning. The Solidarity clause is intended to provide a legal framework for intra-EU assistance to members who have suffered a disaster or terrorist attack.

Taking into account these developments, as well as the fact that Lisbon has not reinvented CSDP to an extend that would enable it to transcend the basic constrictions (lack of common security culture and threat perception; and decreasing defence expenditure) that have plagued it from the beginning, one can draw some conclusions as to the role CSDP can play in European security. For one, Lisbon's consolidation of Europe's civil-military crisis management infrastructure, despite its shortcomings, provides an important basis on which the EU can expand its unique capabilities in that area. Considering that most contemporary threats to European security are of an unconventional nature and more often than not require civilian solutions with only limited military involvement, these capabilities add to security as a whole. They also present a complementary part to NATO capabilities, which is an important contribution Europe can make towards burden-sharing (since larger progress toward what the US might consider an equitable share of the burden is not taking place, nor is it on the horizon).

Turning now to Estonia specifically it is first important to note that Estonia contributes heavily to CSDP operations. 32 Estonian civilian and military personnel are currently deployed to CSDP missions, representing 0.63% of the total EU personnel. While this doesn't sound like much, taking into account the fact that the Estonian population and GDP are only 0.27% and 0.12% respectively of the EU total, once can see that Estonia is contributing significantly above its burden-sharing requirements. Now what does this contribution gain Estonia? I will herein argue that the benefit for Estonia is three-fold.

Firstly, CSDP capabilities can potentially address security issues which are of direct concern to Estonia, more specifically the frozen conflicts in Europe's eastern periphery, but also more general concerns regarding migration, or disaster relief in case there is an incident at a Russian Nuclear facility near Estonia. The EU security cooperation further represents a valuable fall-back option should the withdrawal from European affairs the US is exhibiting at the moment proof prolonged and deep enough to be the undoing of NATO.

That leads to the second benefit. CSDP – though not wholly sufficient – does enable the Europeans to bring more to NATO than they could otherwise. It can hence be argued that a working and effective CSDP helps to keep NATO viable and alive.

The last benefit revolves around the intangible effects of Estonia's contribution to CSDP. Following the same reasoning that sent Estonian troops to Afghanistan, CSDP participation is an act of alliance building and maintenance! Additionally, as indicated by the research conducted for this report, CSDP participation can enable Estonia to exert more influence on the development of European security cooperation than states that do not share the burden of common security with their allies.

Finally, the report ventures some policy recommendations, though considering the as of yet unresolved nature of many of the new aspects of CSDP introduced by Lisbon, the nature of some is

also less well defined. Concerning Estonian participation in CSDP the report can only commend the Estonian contribution and advice their continuation for reasons stated above. As far as the new institutions and mechanisms are concerned the report makes the following recommendations:

- Ensure that cooperative frameworks, such as PESCO, remain accessible to Estonia once they have become formalized. If entry requirements are too high for Estonia to participate fully it will be an important development which Estonia cannot fully partake in.
- Ensure that CSDP becomes as efficient as possible in conducting civil-military operations. This requires a European OHQ in Brussels for the maintenance of rapid reaction capabilities outline in the Headline Goals.
- Attempt to strengthen the HR/VP and EEAS by working towards expanding their portfolio to include security relevant topics that have so far remained un-securitized (such as energy, development and enlargement).

Concerning the hypotheses this report suggests that they are valid, though to varying degree. While CSDP in its current format does provide potential benefit to NATO, it is not clear whether this is sufficient to fortify NATO against the stresses put upon it by the changing international environment. Also, while research strongly indicates that CSDP participation allows states to exhibit increased influence over the development and implementation of the EU's common security, additional and more detailed research is suggested to gain a true measurement of this effect that would allow policy makers to make more informed judgements about the costs and benefits of CSDP participation.

INTRODUCTION

This report aims at analysing the utility the post-Lisbon foreign and defence policy of the EU has for Estonia. In order to conduct such an analysis the following will first discuss in some detail the relevant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and analyse their potential benefits and shortcomings. It will then proceed to outline the role CSDP can play in the contemporary security environment. Lastly this report investigates Estonia's role in CSDP and what CSDP can contribute to Estonian security.

The starting points for this analysis are three hypotheses:

1. The US interest in higher European contributions to the common defence architecture, positive developments in CSDP can strengthen NATO and the transatlantic alliance.
2. CSDP can provide increased security (both domestically and through pursuit of strategic interests abroad) for Estonia.
3. Estonia can utilize participation in CSDP missions and initiatives (such as the battle groups) and wider frameworks like the EDA as a strategic alliance building tool, with the potential to increase its intra-EU efficacy.

The following discussion will show that these hypotheses are valid, though to varying degrees. While CSDP in its current format does provide potential benefit to NATO, it is not clear whether this is sufficient to fortify NATO against the stresses put upon it by the changing international environment. Also, while research strongly indicates that CSDP participation allows states to exhibit increased influence over the development and implementation of the EU's common security, additional and more detailed research is suggested to gain a true measurement of this effect that would allow policy makers to make more informed judgements about the costs and benefits of CSDP participation.

1. CSDP AFTER LISBON

The Lisbon treaty, in an attempt to streamline EU decision making, has introduced four changes with relevance to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): the creation of the High Representative for Foreign Relations and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as well as the inclusion of the Mutual Assistance Clause and the Solidarity Clause into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). In this section each of these changes will be examined and their effects and shortcoming analysed. It is, however, important to note that the ultimate effect of many of these changes is difficult to judge at this point in time, since they are still in their infancy. Nevertheless, it is already possible to get a measure of their potential and shortcomings.

1.1 THE HR/VP

The HR/VP – serving two masters, both Council and Commission – cleverly circumvents the old dichotomy between European federalists and intergovernmentalists.[1] As outlined in the amended TEU (Articles 18, 26, 27 & 30) s/he has three main roles. The first, acting as the High Representative on Foreign Relations and Security Policy, is chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and representing the Union on matters concerning CFSP internationally. S/he also represents the EU in international organizations and at conferences. Both of these functions were formerly filled by the rotating Council Presidency. The second – and for this report more relevant – role of the HR/VP is to shape and implement (in concert with the Council) the Union's CFSP, through his/her right to initiate proposals in the council. Lastly, the HR/VP also acts as vice president of the Commission and is the responsible commissioner for external relations.

The largest impact of the HR/VP lies in the almost complete usurpation of the role formerly played by the Troika. The representation of the Union in CFSP matters, as well as the right to set the agenda for CFSP in both Council (as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and the PSC) and Commission now lies with the HR/VP. One undeniable advantage this might bring is focus and consistency. Having the EU represented internationally by a single office increases the EU's impact on the international stage and facilitates increased dialogue between the EU and other actors. Even more importantly, Lisbon has freed CFSP from the rotating presidency setting the agenda, which had previously led to inconsistency between presidencies, short termism and even standstill when a country holding the presidency was unwilling or unable to set an agenda for foreign policy and defence. In his 'bridging' double hatted role the HR/VP is also ideally placed to ensure consistency in external action between Council and Commission.

This new structure also contains potential problems, most of which are interrelated. One such problem is that there are too many people holding stakes in external relations in addition to the HR/VP. Namely the Commission President, the European Council President and the Council chair.[2] Already the Commission President and the European Council President have begun duplicating foreign policy assets within their own offices[3].

Another shortcoming of the new structure is that many responsibilities with high relevance to foreign and security policy remain in separate Directorates within the Commission – trade, energy and humanitarian assistance are cases in point.[4] Also, the double hatted role of the HR/VP in the Commission and the Council can cause problems when these two bodies are at odds.[5]

All this exacerbates the fact that the HR/VP has an overloaded portfolio to begin with, which can bear little additional load caused by in-fighting over precedence without negatively impacting on the dynamic and creative role the HR/VP has to play in shaping and facilitating CFSP.[6]

[1] Risse (2003): "Auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Außenpolitik? Der Verfassungsentwurf und die europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik"; Integration 26 (4); p. 577
[2] Angelet & Vrailas (2008): „European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty"; Egmont Paper 21; p. 23-24
[3] Interview conducted by Author with Nordic MFA official
[4] Angelet & Vrailas (2008): „European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty"; Egmont Paper 21; p. 23-24
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid p. 24

1.2 THE EEAS

The EEAS is the service under the HR/VP, intended to give him/her the means to fulfil the multiple functions of the office. The EEAS staff is drawn from the Commission, the European Council and seconded personnel from the member states (no national quotas but a maximum of 40% seconded staff). The EEAS swallowed the DG for External relations and part of the Commissions DG Development. As already indicated in the previous section, the EEAS – as supporting organ of the HR/VP – has not integrated all the services from the Council and the Commission that have competencies in matters of foreign and security policy.

By integrating the most vital CSDP structures (CPCC, CMPD, EUMC and EUMS)[7] into the EEAS (see Figure 1) it has been empowered to play a key role in EU crisis management. One most notable example is the introduction of a joint civil-military planning capability – in the form of the CMPD – which was woefully absent before Lisbon, when the planning process of the civilian and the military components of a given mission were carried out separately by the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the EUMS respectively.[8]

Though the EEAS has already contributed to the CSDP agenda – specifically the drafting of a doctrine to further integrate human rights and gender into CSDP[9] – it is yet too early to adequately judge its efficacy. It is, however, possible to identify some potential structural problems. One is the fact that while CPCC, CMPD and EUMS are all situated within the same structure of the EEAS, they are not organized along a clear chain of command. Another much cited criticism concerns the composition of the CMPD leaning heavily towards military planners – civilian experts have been pushed out of the decision making structure and only one fifth of experts in the internal 'integrated strategic planning unit' have civilian planning expertise[10] – de-emphasising civilian crisis management expertise. This appears to be a result of a deal between Berlin and Paris, securing Paris' preferences concerning the CMPD.[11] The eventual effects of this cannot adequately be judged as of yet, but it seems much civilian planning capability will have to be redeveloped within the CMPD.

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[7] **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)**: Established in 2007 it has the mandate to plan and conduct civilian CSDP operations, as well as assist and advice the HR/VP. It is under the control of the PSC. (for further information visit http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1222515/110412%20factsheet%20-%20cpcc%20-%20version%204_en.pdf)
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD): Established by the Lisbon Treaty it combines the former Commission DG's VIII (Defence Aspects) & IX (Civilian Crisis Management), and is intended to provide previously unavailable joint civil and military planning for EU missions.
EU Military Committee (EUMC): Consisting of the member CHOD's (or their respective MilReps) it directs all EU military activities and provides advice and recommendations to the PSC.
EU Military Staff (EUMS): Integrated Military body that provides in-house military expertise to the HR/VP. It is tasked by the EUMC

[8] For a good presentation of the pre-Lisbon mission planning process in the EU view: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Presentation_ESDP_Updated_07_09.pps

[9] Nik Hynek (2011): EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty: civil–military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ, European Security, 20:1, p. 85

[10] Alain Délétroz (2010): „The spoils of EU Reform"; International Crisis Group

[11] Ibid

Figure 1: Exert From the EEAS Organizational Structure; focussing on Crisis Management infrastructure



Source: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf

1.3 PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION

PESCO is a mechanism introduced by the Lisbon treaty, which allows member states to pursue intensified cooperation (in a <EU27 framework) in the fields of military capability development and creation of CSDP active assets. It specifically excludes operations and missions, which will remain under purview of the full Council and voted on by unanimity. PESCO can be established by a QMV in the council. Further, member states can join a PESCO after its creation by a QMV of the already participating states. Also, participating states can be suspended from participation for failing to fulfil the criteria by a similar vote. Hence, no one state is granted veto power over the creation of PESCO, membership accession or suspension. All other decisions surrounding the scope and work of a PESCO are subject to unanimity among the participants.

While this could potentially be of great use in developing CSDP, through its large leeway and flexibility in forming cooperative frameworks, the lack of any further formalization of its structure, or its objectives in the TEU bespeaks the heterogeneous views of the member states which will continue to hamper progress. One example of this ambiguity concerns the membership criteria, of which the text sets out two.[12] However, it remains silent on the issue of whether they are intended as complementary or alternative, the former meaning rather high entry requirements and the latter indicating an inclusive concept.[13]

[12] Article 1 of Protocol No. 10 of the TEU: *„The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to:*
(a) *proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and*
(b) *have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days."*

[13] Angelet & Vrailas (2008): „European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty"; Egmont Paper 21; p. 36

In short, the text of the Lisbon Treaty has left member states with much room for interpretation. This is a process that has yet to take place. Hence, without any working case of PESCO or even its formalized structure and requirements agreed upon, it is very difficult to make a judgement on its merit, other than saying it does have potential but might also lead to nothing. In the end it will come down to the presence of political will to utilize PESCO effectively, for the wording in the TEU leaves ample room for both significant progress and ineffectuality.

1.4 MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY CLAUSES

Article 42 of the treaty sets out the Mutual Assistance Clause, which, for all intents and purposes, is an EU duplication of NATO Article 5.[14] There is little to be said about it, except that so far it has not produced any real life manifestations such as combined EU exercises, contingency planning, let alone any readjustment of force structures, or defence expenditures to address the potential need to defend one another. As such, it seems redundant in the presence of NATO Article V, except as a fall-back in case NATO becomes no longer reliable.

The Solidarity clause, intended to grant assistance to a member state having suffered a disaster or terrorist attack, appears somewhat more relevant. For one, the chances that a member state suffers a large scale terrorist attack or disaster are much more real than those of a military assault on EU territory. However, while decision making procedures are given – proposal to implement the clause made by HR/VP, council votes by QMV (unless there are defence implications which require unanimity) and then the member states coordinate among each other the shape and scope of the assistance (Article 3 (231)) – the text remains vague on the legal nature of the clause (is it a legal provision or a political principal) and whether the suggested preventive and pre-emptive activities (Article 1 (42)) include military means used on EU territory. This seems to indicate a lack of common understanding on these issues, which might render the clause less effective than it could potentially be, but again, without it having been used, it is very difficult to judge its clout.

1.5 SUMMARY

In summary, Lisbon Treaty offers many opportunities in the realm of common security, but does not in itself set CSDP on a progressive course. One of the greatest stumbling blocks that Lisbon has been unable to address is creation of a common understanding of what 'common defence' should entail.[15] It has lent further support to the notion that European common defence, for those states with dual

[14] Comparison of Article 42.7 TEU and Article 5 Treaty of Brussels:
Article 42.7 TEU: *If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.*
Article 5 Treaty of Brussels: *If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.*

[15] Angelet & Vrailas (2008): „European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty"; Egmont Paper 21; p. 18

membership, takes a purely supplementary position with regard to NATO by assuring that it "*shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework"*(Article 42 (2)).

Concerning institutional changes with regard to CSDP the Treaty has empowered the new office of the HR/VP at the expense of the Commission and the council presidency. The treaty does not empower the EU parliament with respect to CSDP, excepting only the position of the HR/VP which – being the vice president of the commission – has to be approved by the parliament. The parliament also has the right to censure the HR/VP (since he/she is part of the Commission).

Also, importantly, it does not lift the need for unanimity when it comes to CSDP issues, be it missions, initiatives (except specific cases like the PESCO), or the signing of contractual documents with security or defence implications. QMV is possible with regard to CSDP decisions, but only in instances the Council has unanimously agreed on voting on a certain issue by QMV. In short, while the Lisbon treaty has formally done away with the pillar-structure – which divided the EU policy areas along lines of decision-making *modi* (supranational or intergovernmental) – CSDP is still very much a realm apart (intergovernmental) from other policy areas. The implication of this clearly is the continued complete dependence on member state interest for development, with no independent internal impetus for evolution.

What the Lisbon treaty has been successful at is the institutionalization of joint disarmament operations, military assistance and advice, conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization (which had been established by the ESS) in addition to the Petersberg tasks.[16] It has also focussed crisis management resources, both already existing and newly created structures, within the EEAS structure under the purview of the HR/VP. Further, it has introduced a provision with the potential to positively impact the planning and launching of missions. Article 42 & 44 enables the council to entrust the implementation of a security task to a group of member states who are willing and able to carry it out. Potentially, once empowered by the council, this group could then, together with HR/VP, carry out all aspects of the given task with, supposedly, no further need for unanimous voting of the whole council[17]. Once again, however, the wording is not precise and no precedence has been set.

Other impediments to the effectiveness of CSDP exist. One such impediment is the lack of long-term vision, required to underpin operational planning. As discussed above, the Lisbon treaty has made little progress in this area. This is largely due to the lack of political consensus concerning the basic tenets of common security, reflected also in the Lisbon treaty

Progress must also be made in central planning and C^2 infrastructure, which in its current state is not up to the tasks set by the Headline Goal process – in particular rapid reaction is unattainable with the current ad-hoc set-up[18]. The current set-up presents three possible options for missions. One is the

[16] Ibid p. 19
[17] Ibid P.32
[18] Simòn & Mattelaer (2011): "EUnity of Command – The Planning and Conduct of CSDP Operations"; Egmont Paper 41, p. 8

Berlin-Plus agreement, by which the EU can utilise NATO infrastructure (ALTHEA is an example of this). This option has the advantage of being cost-effective (infrastructure already exist) and it would intensify the relationship between CSDP and NATO, as well as ease concerns among members keen on avoiding any sort of duplication. However, the Turkey-issue makes this option somewhat unreliable.

The next option is utilizing the HQ's of the EU framework nations.[19] As was shown by the EUFOR RD Congo mission[20], organizing an OHQ ad-hoc among the framework nations is rather inflexible and can be a stumbling block. Additional problems here are the lack civil-military competencies in the national HQ's and the fact that they have to fulfil other duties with respect to their national roles. The final option would be the use of the EU Operations Centre within the EUMS. Since this is not permanently staffed – excepting a skeleton staff of 8 – it would require extra time before it becomes operational in case of a mission. It is also only able to handle a limited size operation.

In conclusion the Lisbon treaty has introduced some potential into CSDP, but has not lessened the need for member states to muster the political will to see advancement in common defence. Much of the eventual effect of Lisbon on CSDP, and CFSP in general, will depend on the political will of the member states. The vague language of the Lisbon treaty on key defence and security issues clearly indicates that the members (as a group) do not have sufficient political will to overcome paradigmatic differences at the moment. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in most of 'Old Europe' defence issues – especially in the current era of fiscal and economic policy primacy – are unable gain politicians favour with their constituency; and can even be counterproductive for governing parties when including additional monetary commitments, involvement in armed conflict (true for Germany especially), or further transfer of 'sovereignty' in defence matters to the EU (UK in particular).

One important step in making political effort for CSDP development could hence be positive interest on part of the constituency. It could be argued that to raise CSDP's profile in this regard the development of a clear strategy and security concept that appeals to the European constituency would go a long way. However, much of the disagreement about the direction European common defence should take stems from the differing security cultures among the members. Hence, this is not a matter of launching a PR campaign, but rather an incremental process of convergence between cultures through interaction within the institutional framework of the EU. There has been much scientific research into this form of socialization[21], both in psychology and the social sciences. Research conducted specifically into the 'europeanizing' effect of EU common security and defence structures strongly suggests a socializing impact on officials involved in the work of the PSC, EUMS

[19] There are HQ's in France, Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy, of which France Germany and the UK have already been used for missions.

[20] "*Uncertainty as to which Member State would provide the OHQ* [for the EUFOR RD Congo mission] *resulted in a paralysis of the planning process once the Crisis Management Concept was adopted in February 2006. The paralysis lasted for one month and jeopardised the EU's ability to deploy in Congo before the elections. Most officials involved in the planning of the operation assert that EUFOR RD Congo's timely deployment was only possible due to a delay in Congo's electoral process*"; Simòn & Mattelaer (2011:8)

[21] For a more detailed background into the theory of the socializing impact of international organizations please read: Lindberg (1971): "The Political Dynamics of European Integration" Stanford, CA: Princeton University Press; and Lindberg & Scheingold, (1970): "Europe's Would-Be Polity —Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall

and EUMC.[22] This elite effect, however, has – as shown by the still apparent divergence in strategic culture – not yet permeated to the wider member states and the constituency.

Hence, the socializing effect of cooperation within the EU is unlikely to lead to progress in the short term. Another factor that can lead to a conversion of strategic cultures in Europe is changing threat perceptions, brought about by changes in the security environment. There are two conceivable scenarios for this, one positive (a new threat arises) and one negative (sources of security disappear). The emergence of a new (or newly realized) military threat, with the salience to cause uniformity of defence interests in Europe, in the foreseeable future is unlikely; and this report will not venture into an analysis and forecast of Europe's security environment.

The latter scenario does, however, seem realistic. Though it is a slow process, the US seems to be orienting itself towards the Pacific and away from Europe.[23] This reorientation has already manifested itself in the US announcement that 2,500 Marines will be stationed in Australia, as well as in the economic realm, where the US places an ever increasing emphasis on trans-pacific-trade.[24] The question is: what impact would the refocusing of US interests have on the EU? So far, evidence suggests very little. For one, NATO is still around and doesn't seem on the brink of collapse – despite on-going disagreements about burden sharing and strategic outlook. Also, there seems to be little general concern in the older parts of the EU concerning a potential shift of US strategic interest, since from "*the perspective of many West European countries, the US is no longer indispensable as a security provider and thus as a shield against fear*" (Meyer 2005:535). This assessment is also corroborated by the only incremental convergence of EU security cultures discussed above. As a Nordic MFA official put is "*the paradigmatic shift in the US is not sufficient to compel European nations to bridge their differences concerning defence*".[25]

2. WHAT CAN CSDP CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY?

When answering the question of what contribution to European security CSDP can make the fact that many aspects of CSDP (i.e. PESCO or the Solidarity Clause) still linger in the realm of the theoretical becomes a stumbling block for any decent argument. What is safe to surmise is the fact that CSDP cannot provide conventional military security to the EU members. It lacks everything that makes NATO viable in this area: political will, funding, US involvement and infrastructure. This, however,

[22] Cornish and Edwards (2001): "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture"; *International Affairs* 77(3):587–603; and Meyer (2005): "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms"; *European Journal of International Relations* 11: 523

[23] President Obama referred to himself as „the first pacific President" during a speech given in Tokyo, Japan, November 13, 2009.

[24] The US is currently negotiating a trade agreement with the Pacific region (Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TTP) agreement). The TPP countries are already the fourth largest goods and services export market of the United States and are growing rapidly (exports increased by 25.5% since 2009). U.S. goods exports to the broader Asia-Pacific totalled $775 billion in 2010, equal to 61% of total U.S. goods exports. Source: *http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership*

[25] Interview by the Author with a Nordic MFA official

seems to be a foregone conclusion, since CSDP is – despite the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses – not a tool designed to provide territorial defence.

However, as has been repeated ad nauseam for years, Europe's contemporary security environment boasts mostly unconventional threats – proliferation, failed states, frozen conflicts, demographic changes, migration, communicable diseases, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, energy security etc. – that require a completely different approach and toolbox from territorial defence. NATO has been in a process of adapting to this security environment, of which process the focus on out-of-area missions and the transformation of members' armed forces towards a more expeditionary potential are indicative.[26]

Despite any past or future transformation, NATO remains a military alliance. But, no amount of military clout will address the majority of these issues by itself. The civil-military component – through conflict prevention, stabilization and state building capabilities – is where CSDP offers a valuable set of opportunities, which, if utilized correctly, can offer great benefits to Europe and even the transatlantic alliance as a whole. Here Lisbon has created a more streamlined infrastructure and better civil-military planning and conduct capabilities.

In terms of civil crisis management in all its facets the EU is far ahead of NATO. Washington, while still urging Europe to step up its defence expenditure, has clearly recognized the potential of the civilian and civil-military crisis management component developed by the EU. Washington now seeks to support European efforts in this area. In the past years Europe has seen many visits from US officials interested in Europe's expertise.[27] It is also worth mentioning that the US has a vital interest in an EU able to deal with contingencies in which Washington has little interest getting involved with – especially in light of the burden sharing debate – such as crisis management and conflict resolution in the EU neighbourhood.

It is hence through civilian crisis management, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization that CSDP can contribute most to European security. One real advantage such a focus could give CSDP over NATO is freedom from the dilemma of territorial defence vs. intervention abroad[28], since it is by definition employed out-of-area. However, the introduction of the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses have somewhat muddled this focus. Another advantage is the clear distinction from NATO, by the promotion of which both institutions are strengthened, and nations anxious about detracting from NATO through CSDP mollified.

3. HOW CAN ESTONIA BEST UTILIZE CSDP?

3.1 ESTONIA'S PARTICIPATION IN CSDP MISSIONS

In order to ascertain the best way for Estonia to utilize CSDP it is prudent to first look at Estonia's current involvement in CSDP, which is considerable. Estonia currently has personnel deployed in 7

[26] [26] Interview by the Author with Nordic defence policy expert

[27] March 2008 EU-US „Workplan for Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention" (see: http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/eu_us_crisis_management_work_plan_en.pdf)

[28] Angelet & Vrailas (2008): „European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty"; Egmont Paper 21; p. 52

out of 12 CSDP missions (in addition Estonia also participates in the Nordic BG, which is currently out of rotation). These include 10 military personnel in EUNAVFOR rotation, 2 military personnel in EUFOR/ALTHEA, 4 civilians in EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, 2 in EUPOL COPPS, 1 in EUPM BIH, 9 in EULEX KOSOVO and 4 in EUMM GEORGIA. This is a considerable commitment and in fact Estonia is punching far above its weight in terms of CSDP participation (see figure 2).

The next thing to notice is that Estonia deploys 14 military personnel and 20 civilians, while only 1/3 of total CSDP operations are military. Further, there is a wide spread in area and purpose of the missions. In area the involvement ranges from the EU neighbourhood to the horn of Africa and Afghanistan; and in purpose it ranges from police training over state building to combatting piracy on the seas. In short, Estonia participates in every conceivable aspect of CSDP, both military and civilian, in areas of Estonia's national interest (Georgia), those in the wider EU's interest (the Balkans) and those of global (EUNAVFOR) and transatlantic (Afghanistan) interest.

The question now is what does Estonia want to achieve with its foreign and security policy? The national security concept (NSC) and national defence strategy (NDS) identify the following threats:

- Russian revisionism
- Acts against the unity of NATO
- External coercion affecting internal stability or the external reputation od Estonia
- Exposure to risk through Estonia's isolation from the larger EU energy grid
- Cyber-attacks on critical information and communication infrastructure
- Spread of extremist ideology within Estonian society
- Cross border trafficking and transnational organized crime
- Terrorism
- Disasters caused by natural events, the outbreak of disease, radiation accidents and environmental damage to the Baltic Sea through a shipping accident.

In the pursuit to address these security concerns the NSC and NDS identify the cohesion and functionality of NATO as the ultimate guarantor of Estonia's territorial integrity. It further puts strong emphasis on the bilateral relationship between Estonia and the US. The NDS in particular recognizes the Lisbon additions of the Mutual Assistance Clause and to CSDP in general as an important additional guarantor of security and emphasises especially the need for a working relationship between the EU and NATO.

In general these national security documents appear to accurately reflect the role both NATO and the EU can play with regard to national security. The fact that participation within these organizations is the best way to ensure Estonia's influence on the development of these mechanisms is also recognised.

> "*Estonia's political weight in NATO and CSDP decision-making processes depends on our active participation in providing solutions to key NATO and CSDP challenges. Estonia's relative contribution to NATO and the EU must be active and visible, considering Estonia's small size.*"[29]

[29] National Defence Strategy of Estonia, p.9

Figure 2: Showing EU member state's participation in CSDP missions adjusted by GDP and Population*

	Population	%age EU Total	GDP (Million)	%age EU Total	Contribution to CDSP Missions	%age EU Total	Contribution of Military personnell to CSDP	%age of Total Armed Forces	%age of EU Total	Forces pledged to CSDP	%age of EU Total	%age of Pledge fulfilled
Austria	8 217 280	1,65	284 410	2,36	406	8,22	359	1,28	13,37	149	1,50	272,48
Belgium	10 431 477	2,09	352 941	2,93	77	1,56	18	0,05	0,67	467	4,70	16,49
Bulgaria	7 093 635	1,42	36 033	0,30	211	4,27	118	0,36	4,39	302	3,04	69,87
Cyprus	803 147	0,16	17 465	0,15	6	0,12	3	0,02	0,11	2	0,02	300,00
Czech Republic	10 535 811	2,12	145 049	1,21	51	1,03	5	0,02	0,19	101	1,02	50,50
Estonia	1 340 194	0,27	14 501	0,12	31	0,63	1	0,03	0,04	124	1,25	25,00
Finland	5 388 417	1,08	180 253	1,50	183	3,71	14	0,04	0,52	296	2,98	61,82
France	65 821 885	13,22	1 932 802	16,06	423	8,56	237	0,10	8,83	1424	14,33	29,71
Germany	81 799 600	16,42	2 498 800	20,76	574	11,62	339	0,14	12,63	205	2,06	280,00
Greece	11 305 118	2,27	230 173	1,91	250	5,06	206	0,15	7,67	324	3,26	77,16
Hungary	9 979 000	2,00	98 446	0,82	247	5,00	178	0,85	6,63	188	1,89	131,38
Ireland	6 197 100	1,24	153 938	1,28	93	1,88	49	0,49	1,82	95	0,96	97,89
Italy	60 642 308	12,18	1 548 816	12,87	482	9,76	224	0,12	8,34	1208	12,15	39,90
Latvia	2 245 357	0,45	17 971	0,15	12	0,24	0	0,00	0,00	94	0,95	12,77
Lithuania	3 214 900	0,65	27 410	0,23	17	0,34	1	0,01	0,04	147	1,48	11,56
Luxembourg	51 184	0,01	41 597	0,35	18	0,36	15	1,70	0,56	44	0,44	40,91
Malta	417 608	0,08	6 233	0,05	9	0,18	4	0,19	0,15	41	0,41	21,95
Netherlands	16 694 400	3,35	591 477	4,91	175	3,54	87	0,18	3,24	240	2,41	72,92
Poland	38 186 860	7,67	354 316	2,94	220	4,45	44	0,04	1,64	345	3,47	63,77
Portugal	10 647 763	2,14	172 699	1,43	263	5,32	236	0,60	8,79	747	7,52	35,21
Romania	21 904 551	4,40	121 941	1,01	318	6,44	59	0,08	2,20	580	5,84	54,83
Slovakia	5 429 763	1,09	65 905	0,55	61	1,24	45	0,31	1,68	145	1,46	42,07
Slovenia	2 048 951	0,41	35 974	0,30	50	1,01	17	0,24	0,63	180	1,81	27,78
Spain	46 030 109	9,24	1 062 591	8,83	375	7,59	333	0,24	12,40	1238	12,46	30,29
Sweden	9 354 462	1,88	346 667	2,88	148	3,00	11	0,06	0,41	484	4,87	30,58
UK	62 262 000	12,50	1 696 583	14,10	239	4,84	82	0,04	3,05	769	7,74	31,08
EU TOTALS	498 042 880		12 034 991		4 939		2 685	0,16		9939		27,01

*This data has been taken from the "CSDP Map Project" of the ISIS. The data has proven not 100% reliable, but has been judged accurate enough to make an analysis of the adjusted contributions to CSDP by the member states. A green colour marker indicates that the state in question commits more personnel to CSDP missions (as %age of total personnel deployed to CSDP) than could be expected from the states relative population (%age of total EU population) and GDP (%age of total EU GDP) respectively. A red colour marker indicates the opposite.

In short, Estonia's actions concerning CSDP accurately reflect its stated ambition. It is extremely active in CSDP and has, in my estimation, chosen its involvement correctly. The only question here seems to be why this is not widely recognized as such?

The question that emerges is whether the assumption that participation in CSDP actually increases the influence a state has within this structure is actually valid? The answer to this is not easily attainable, for the simple reason that measuring 'influence' is tricky to say the least. What can also be said is that this concept, be it within NATO or CSDP, appears to be a widely held belief among smaller participating states. Since the other two Baltic States are, for all intents and purposes, not participating in CSDP missions (except in the Battlegroups), Estonia is very much on the Nordic side of the Baltic Spectrum. The general perception here is that continuous strong involvement in all parts of CSDP has enabled the Nordics to punch above their weight when it comes to influence within CSDP. The manifestation of this intangible benefit is mainly the frequency with which both Finland and Sweden are consulted by other member states on CSDP matters.[30]

The next question this raises is whether cooperation in CSDP missions and initiatives positively effects the bilateral relations between the participating states? To accurately answer this query would require a separate research project focussed on the effects of cooperation in CSDP and based on a wide range of countries. The tentative answer that emerged during the research for this, broader, project is yes, but the effect should not be overstated.

Having established this intangible benefit of CSDP participation, the analysis now shifts towards the missions Estonia is participating in. It could be argued that Estonian involvement in Georgia, Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina actively helps to secure the European periphery, which, considering the potential costs should larger scale interventions become necessary is prudent. However, with the possible exception of Georgia, the actual threat to Estonian interests from these contingencies is vague. Despite the fact that this is also in line with Estonia's stated foreign and security policy goal to maintain a stable and peaceful European periphery, in actuality Estonian participation is a manifestation of the desire to support CSDP and all communal European approaches to security. Nonetheless, the capabilities CSDP develops and deploys here, are also suitable to address the potential future need to deal with the frozen conflicts on Europe's eastern periphery (Transnistria, Nargorno-Karabakh and the no longer so frozen Abkhazien and Ossetian disputes in Georgia), which effect Estonian security and strategic interests much more directly than the Balkans. Another, intangible factor, which recommends the missions in Kosovo and Bosnia is the historic relevance of stabilizing the Balkans. A European disaster can, by the success of these missions, be turned into a CSDP success here.

Estonia's participation in EUNAVFOR, which is a very high visibility mission, is extremely prudent. The mission is: 1) high profile with lots of news coverage; 2) potentially involves combat situations and participation is hence a manifestation of risk sharing; and 3) the EUNAVFOR HQ is in the UK and the Estonian soldiers are deployed to a German vessel, two states with which any form of relationship building can only be beneficial (though all potential benefits vis-à-vis the UK are likely dwarfed by those established through the Afghanistan deployment under British command).

[30] Interviews conducted by author with MFA and MoD officials

The EUPOL Afghanistan mission represents more of a mixed bag, since it is receiving bad publicity and negative scrutiny from the US. However, the fact that Estonia and many of its allies have invested so much in the wider Afghan scenario, it becomes a question of the overall commitment and burden sharing to assist in the building of the Afghan police. The fact that EUPOL is a follow-up to the failed German GPPO – the bad performance of which left Germany embarrassed – creates another opportunity for Estonia to show dedication and commitment towards its European allies.

Following the logic of this argument, any participation in CSDP is of value and the decision to participate or not becomes a cost-benefit analysis. If personnel or budgetary constraints would require Estonia scale down involvement in CSDP, EUPOL COPPS would be the mission that should be cut first. It is neither in an area of Estonian special interest, nor does it have any other characteristic that would recommend it above and beyond other missions.

The last CSDP aspect Estonia is participating in, which should be discussed is the Nordic BG. Again, whether by choice or not, the Nordic BG is the best possible BG for Estonia to be involved in. It further intensifies Estonia's relationship with the Nordics (as it requires many working level contacts and common legal instruments) and revitalizes contacts that might have been dormant after the end of the tight cooperation during the 1990's.[31] It further amplifies Estonia's focus on the Baltic Sea Region, which is without a doubt of great relevance to Estonian security – as also laid out in the NDS. Lastly, though the BG's have never been deployed, they represent a development within CSDP that has many potential avenues to expand and should for this reason alone be joined. In addition cooperation within a BG provides the very tangible benefits of enhancing interoperability, gives opportunities for intensified exercises and can act as a catalyst towards development of an effectively deployable unit structure. The other Baltic States have reached similar conclusions, participating in nothing but the BG's (except Lithuania's one officer in EUNAVFOR)

3.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering that Estonia is participating in all aspects of CSDP on a high level, comparatively speaking, it stands to reason that Estonia has a vested interest in the development of CSDP. Though, it might seem that all progress in intensifying the EU common defence and security structures will positively impact Estonia's security, in fact Estonia does not stand to benefit from all developments.

The first thing that is to consider is the primacy of NATO for Estonia's traditional security needs. This primacy is given for good reason, as CSDP – considering the budgetary constraints, the ever rising costs keeping the defence forces equipped with up-to-date hardware (defence inflation)[32] and the lack of political and societal consensus – will not in the foreseeable future be adequate to the task of defending Europe. There has been much argument about the effect of outside pressures, such as budgetary limitations forcing common procurement, or US detachment from European security affairs requiring faster and tighter defence cooperation. These pressure, though certainly real and not without effect, do not suffice to overcome national interests in preserving sovereignty and the

[31] Interview conducted by author with MoD official
[32] Interview conducted by Author with Nordic defence policy expert

pursuit of national agendas. CSDP will develop gradually, along mechanisms such as PESCO or 'pooling and sharing', but will not exhibit spontaneous explosions of development.

This, however, very much serves Estonia! The current basic set-up – CSDP focussing on crisis management and civil-military endeavours – is conducive to Estonia's need to maintain NATO, and improve the inter-organizational cooperation. Somewhat unexpectedly, the notion that the current distribution of responsibilities between NATO and the EU is a desirable status-quo is held by both Nordic and Baltic countries – who couldn't be more different when it comes to any other policy concerning CSDP.[33] What does lie in Estonia's interest is to make CSDP work as efficiently as possible in providing these complementary capabilities. As has been discussed in the first section, the Lisbon treaty has introduced many possibilities, but created precious few accomplished facts.

One such accomplished fact is the HR/VP and the changes it has brought on concerning the council. By taking all of the initiative power from the rotating presidency it is no longer possible – for small states in particular – to set the agenda during their presidency. This is certainly a chance lost, even though it is debateable how much could be achieved during the six months term. It is however true that any initiative by member states now has to come through the HR/VP and here large states are clearly at an advantage. The HR/VP will find it difficult to drop an initiative forwarded by the Weimar triangle for example, while those from individual smaller states are more easily put aside. This means that Estonia will have to work with other EU partners to influence the CSDP development. But, it can rightly be argued that this has always been the case and, hence, all things considered, the consistency and focus that the HR/VP can bring to CSDP is an overall gain. Therefore, the best strategy for Estonia – which it already appears to be pursuing – is wide participation in European defence, in order to be able to gather allies and like-minded member states to influence developments on the EU level.

The fact that the EEAS has managed to internalize all the most important crisis management infrastructures is possibly one of the greatest benefits of the Lisbon treaty. In order to further increase its effectiveness it should be Estonia's aim to eventually find ways to integrate the crisis management bodies in a coherent chain of command. In the question of OHQ for EU missions Estonia should strive for the development of an EU OHQ, specialized in the planning and execution of civilian or civil-military missions, with enough standing capacity to provide for rapid reaction. For purely military deployments the Berlin+ solution is preferable, as it will bind CSDP and NATO closer together, as well as likely be a notion supported by key allies such as the UK. It is, however, worth noting that this is not a Nordic optimal outcome.

Another potential agenda topic for Estonian policy vis-à-vis the EEAS is the further integration of Commission DG's with foreign policy and security relevant portfolios into the EEAS structure. In particular the DG's Humanitarian Aid/Crisis Response, Enlargement and the external and security aspects of Energy should eventually be integrated into the EEAS, probably as part of the geographic desks. The reason for this is the relevance of these topics for important aspects of the current security environment, especially in light of a comprehensive approach to security

[33] Interviews conducted by Author with officials and experts in the Baltic and Nordic countries.

As discussed in the first section, PESCO remains in limbo. The eventual outline and criteria will at some point be established, however, during this process Estonia should work towards keeping the entry requirements low enough so it can partake, but as high as possible to make the eventual outcome worthwhile. Interestingly, the lack of common understanding concerning PESCO combined with the mounting fiscal pressures on defence budgets has led to the "Ghent Framework", which refers to a semi-formal meeting of the defence ministers – outside the monthly foreign affairs council meetings – which was established during the Belgium presidency in 2010.

This new format led to the introduction of the German-Swedish initiative titled "pooling and sharing" (PnS). PnS basically calls for:

1) The systematic analysis of each member states armed forces along three categories (a) capability and support structures which must remain under the sole purview of the states; b) those where cooperation is possible without creating too strong dependencies; c)those where reliance on other EU member states is acceptable)
2) Setting criteria for areas of future cooperation along the lines of operational effectiveness, economic efficiency and political implications.
3) Intensified cooperation by pooling (creating combined resources), or sharing (one state utilizing the resources of another on a case-by-case basis) in areas where the previous analysis had identified potential.

The PnS framework does provide the potential of great synergy effects and the creation of a stepping stone for further integrated defence development. Though the cooperation among partners within the Ghent Framework and PnS might lead to a permanent and structured approach as envisioned by PESCO, it does not have to adopt such a format. It would also allow for subsets of states to pool and share, leading to a system where, for instance, group 'A' jointly develops capability 'X'. Estonia, who is already pooling and sharing in other settings – i.e. diplomatic resources within the NB8 and the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) programme –, could utilize the PnS for further initiatives of cost-efficient capability development. The participants of the Nordic BG would offer many potential benefits in this respect. For one, there is already a strong working relationship and shared interests in the development of procurement of assets to allow the BG to fulfil its tasks. The latter, especially, is cost intensive and careful analysis might yield possibilities to lower costs while maintaining effectiveness through PnS. PnS would also be a good framework to further intensify 3B security cooperation, though it is not clear what additional incentive PnS provides above and beyond the already present, yet often insufficient incentives[34] to cooperate closely among the Baltic states.

4. CONCLUSION

In summary, CSDP offers benefits, both tangible and intangible, to Estonia. While NATO remains the primary actor in the field of conventional security CSDP can contribute greatly to the transatlantic security environment by providing complementary services for which NATO is ill structured and

[34] The three baltic States are too small to maintain full spectrum armed forces individually, they share similar threat perceptions and work under tide budgetary contraints.

equipped. The contemporary security environment, as identified by general consensus and Estonia's official security documentation alike, amplifies the importance of the CSDP civil-military crisis management assets.

Hence, Estonia, by strengthening European common security through considerable participation, also adds additional purpose to the transatlantic alliance. The combination of a shift in the world balance of power towards Asia, together with the US dissatisfaction concerning European contributions to global security poses a real and credible challenge to the transatlantic alliance; and with it the security architecture of Europe. While some European states seem unconcerned with this, Estonia is rightly interested in keeping NATO – the only organization with the military clout to actually protect Europe – intact. Any advance in European capabilities is therefore a step in the right direction. It goes without saying that the US would prefer the expansion of Europe's military capabilities above and beyond what we see within CSDP, nonetheless the development of complementary capabilities to NATO also is a contribution.

In a sense it is a question whether Estonia serves the maintenance of the transatlantic alliance better by investing in NATO participation, where it establishes direct connections with the US, but has small overall impact, or invest more in European defence cooperation, which could in turn contribute exponentially more to burden-sharing in NATO? Considering the evidence gathered so far Estonia is well served to keep a foot firmly in both organisations. Small states always have to weigh how much they can engage with their allies without overextending themselves, while ensuring that they won't be abandoned when the need arises.

The additional and not be underestimate benefit that CSDP offers Estonia, is the amplification of Estonian influence within CFSP development process. It might be beneficial to conduct additional research with the aim to get a better measure of the size of this effect. Such research might could also shed light on the question of whether the joint participation in CSDP missions improved the bilateral relations between participating states in a meaningful. Research for this report has suggested that this is the case, even though the impact could not be measured. It would be beneficial to conduct additional detailed research into this issue, since being able to put a more accurate measurement on these assertions would directly benefit policy makers.

Conclusions that can be drawn are that Estonia benefits form participation in CSDP. As such Estonia has been correct in participating in a wide array of missions, with a multitude of partners, for this is the best way to ensure visibility and recognition, as well as to strengthen CSDP as a whole. It would therefore, not be advisable for Estonia to overspecialize in niche capabilities, both militarily and in civilian crisis management. In both areas Estonia should maintain as wide a spectrum as possible to be able to contribute to both NATO and EU missions when needed, whilst maintaining an adequate level of domestic defence.

As far as development of CSDP is concerned Estonia should seek to streamline crisis management decision making, broaden the purview of CSDP to all security relevant matters and maintain a close working relationship between the EU and NATO. In concrete policy suggestion this means to push for the creation of a coherent chain of command within the EEAS, further integration of parts of the

Commission with Security relevant portfolios under the HR/VP and establishing NATO $C^{2/3}$ assets as the facilitating HQ for CSDP.